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FOREWORD BY AMELIA FLETCHER 
This report was commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) from London 
Economics in association with Steffen Huck and Jidong Zhou (University College 
London). It examines the implications of consumer behavioural biases for firms' 
decisions and hence for competitive equilibria.  
Consumer behavioural biases imply that consumers may not behave in the fully 
rational way that many economic models presume. What impact do these biases 
have on competition? Specifically, how does competition and pricing change 
when consumers are biased? Can inefficiencies that arise from consumer 
behavioural biases be mitigated by lowering barriers to entry? Do biased 
consumers make rational ones better or worse off? And will biased consumer 
behaviour be overcome through learning or education?  
 
This report reviews the empirical and theoretical behavioural economic literature 
to answer these questions. It looks at the key implications for consumer and 
competition policy in particular to understand how and when competitive 
equilibrium may change for the worse. It also contributes to our understanding 
of when, why, and how we should intervene. 
The views of this paper are those of authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the OFT nor the legal position under existing competition or consumer 
law which the OFT applies in exercise of its enforcement functions. Rather the 
aim of the report is to shed some evidence on this interesting issue, and 
promote economic debate in this area. 
This report is part of the OFT's Economic Discussion Paper series. If you would 
like to comment on the paper, please write to me, Amelia Fletcher, at the 
address below. The OFT welcomes suggestions for future research topics on all 
aspects of UK competition and consumer policy. 
Dr Amelia Fletcher, 
Chief Economist 
Office of Fair Trading, 
Fleetbank House, 
2-6 Salisbury Square 
London EC4Y 8JX 
amelia.fletcher@oft.gsi.gov.uk 
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
1.1 This is a survey of studies that examine competition in the presence of 
behaviourally biased or boundedly rational consumers. It will tackle 
questions such as: How does competition and pricing change when 
consumers are biased? Can inefficiencies that arise from consumer 
behavioural biases be mitigated by lowering barriers to entry? Do biased 
consumers make rational ones better or worse off? And will biased 
consumer behaviour be overcome through learning or education?  
1.2 Most traditional analyses of competition focus on the supply side. They 
study how industries will be organised under different informational and 
technological assumptions. Consumers feed into these models simply in 
the form of well-behaved demand functions. This is different in the 
literature surveyed here. In these models consumers have a presence 
and their decision rules are modelled in detail. 
1.3 Consumers’ behaviour may deviate from the orthodox ideal of perfect 
rationality in many different ways. Consumers may suffer from cognitive 
limitations that make the comparison of products and prices harder or 
they may be prone to a wide range of behavioural biases: They might be 
overoptimistic about the future or overconfident in their ability to avoid 
accidents. They might be overly afraid to lose compared to the status 
quo and sometimes their preferences might change from one day to the 
next. 
1.4 Although bounded rationality and behavioural biases among consumers 
is not a new theme, most papers that we survey here are fairly recent, 
with the vast majority published in just the last five years. Looking at the 
rate with which this literature has grown, it seems fair to speak of an 
explosion that has taken place. There are many reasons why this 
explosion happened at this time.  
1.5 Throughout the 1980s and 90s the economics literature gathered at an 
increasingly fast rate studies that demonstrated that something was 
wrong with the neoclassical rational actor paradigm. Most of these 
studies were economic experiments and more and more theorists turned 
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to empirical research either in the form of conducting laboratory 
experiments themselves or through designing new models of behaviour 
that make sense of the data generated by the experiments. It was this 
proliferation of new models of behaviour that started around the new 
millennium that made it possible to re-examine different areas of 
economics with new (and often more realistic) assumptions about 
human behaviour.  
1.6 The new literature on 'bounded rationality and industrial organisation' 
(the title of the first graduate textbook on the field that has just 
appeared)1 has to be seen in this 'revisionist' context. The literature is 
very model-oriented and mainly theoretical. Empirical studies that put it 
to a test - that is, studies that both prove the existence of behavioural 
bias among consumers in a particular setting and then examine actual 
firm behaviour - are extremely rare. Nevertheless, our survey includes a 
brief chapter on empirical strategies that can be employed for examining 
markets with biased consumers. 
1.7 Our survey shows that the literature as it stands today deserves to be 
taken seriously. It is more than a collection of intellectually interesting 
curiosities. The literature can be grouped into relevant areas of consumer 
choice and shows substantial consistency and robustness within each 
area.  
1.8 Perhaps the most striking result of the literature so far is that increasing 
competition through fostering entry of more firms may not always make 
consumers better off and in specific circumstances may even make 
consumers worse off.  
1.9 The standard intuition within the traditional industrial organisation 
literature is that competition increases consumer welfare. This standard 
intuition holds if biases simply distort consumers demand without 
actually affecting their desire to search for the best deals in light of their 
demand. Examples of such biases include over or underestimating one’s 
                                     
1 Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organisation, Spiegler (2010).   
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demand for certain goods or services, or shifts in willingness to pay due 
to reference points and loss aversion. Entry from more firms can never 
do harm to consumers in these scenarios and will mostly make them 
strictly better off. In these situations, profits made from biases are 
seldom fully dissipated unless competition approaches the level of 
perfect competition. However even if competition is perfect, it is unable 
to eradicate allocative inefficiencies that may arise in response to 
distortions driven by biases. For example, biases and the cross subsidies 
they generate may lead to overproduction of goods that in the end will 
be thrown away or suboptimal design of products that may have too 
much of one attribute and too little of another.  
1.10 On the other hand, increasing competition may not always benefit 
consumers and, under specific conditions, may even harm consumers. 
When there are at least some consumers who do not search properly or 
have difficulties judging quality, firms may not need to compete by 
offering better deals (in the form of lower prices or better quality or 
both). Consumers may not search properly because they have a 
particular liking of specific brands, or may be particularly lazy or just 
misjudge prices. Likewise consumers that have difficulties judging quality 
can mistake inferior goods for superior goods. In these situations firms 
can focus on exploiting biased consumers who are likely to purchase 
from them regardless of price and quality. Under these conditions 
increased competition does not help because consumers do not improve 
their decision making.  
1.11 The adverse effects of poor decisions with regards to search and quality 
can be made worse through firms' deliberate attempts to make price 
comparisons and search harder - through complex pricing, shrouding, 
obfuscation and other means. In general the literature shows that firms 
will engage in such obfuscation when possible as it ‘softens’ the level of 
competition between them. Furthermore, when the incentives to engage 
in such activities become more intense when there are more 
competitors, we may even get the result that competition harms 
consumers. For example if more competition leads to more complex 
pricing, under certain model specifications average prices may actually 
increase.  
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1.12 There are, of course, remedies other than increasing competition via 
entry that can improve market outcomes. We discuss consumer learning 
and education, reputation building by firms, better information leading to 
improved market transparency as well as standardisation of information. 
Each of these remedies is shown to be potentially effective in some 
classes of situations. 
1.13 Learning and education have naturally the biggest scope for alleviating 
market failures where consumers’ deviations from rational behaviour are 
due to errors that can be detected and realised ex post. A good example 
for this would be a consumer who overestimates the quantity that he 
desires of a certain good and, hence, will find out eventually that he has 
unused units that go to waste. 
1.14 In situations where firms have an incentive to exploit errors in consumer 
decision making, there might, of course, also exist an incentive for firms 
to establish a reputation for not engaging in such exploitation. For 
example, firms might build a reputation for offering simple pricing 
structures and not hiding any extra charges.  
1.15 Better information about price and quality is intuitively appealing 
whenever consumers need to engage in active search before purchasing 
a product. Search may involve travelling (or going up and down the high 
street) utilizing the internet. Regardless of the precise means of search, 
easier access to hard information about prices and reliable information 
about quality will discipline firms and aid consumers. 
1.16 Of course, when consumers have cognitive limitations it is not only 
available information that may matter but also its presentation. The same 
tariff may be explained in a simple or more complicated manner. 
Moreover, different suppliers might present similarly structured tariffs in 
different ways which will make comparisons much harder if consumers 
struggle to process such complex information. The survey will also show 
how this very fact creates incentives for firms to present information, for 
example, about prices, in convoluted ways. Here enforced 
standardisation of information can be an effective remedy. 
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1.17 The survey is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 we introduce a 
taxonomy of the literature in order to classify different deviations from 
rationality. Chapter 3 contains the survey as such with six subsections, 
one for each of the six categories that we have identified. Chapter 4 
discusses remedies – how competition, information, learning and 
reputation can help to improve outcomes for consumers. Chapter 5 
discusses empirical strategies and Chapter 6 concludes. 
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2 A TAXONOMY FOR THE LITERATURE 
2.1 There are different plausible ways of categorising studies into markets 
with behaviourally biased consumers. One natural way would be to take 
the biases themselves as starting point on the basis that they are the 
root cause of a consumer’s particular choice. An alternative would be to 
start from the observable consequences of different biases, that is, to 
start from the choice that consumers make as a result of the biases.  
2.2 From an applied perspective starting from the consumer’s choice is 
attractive as choice is, in contrast to biased consumer preferences or 
beliefs, directly observable. Moreover findings about the key policy 
issues, sources of biases and remedies, can be organised along the 
categories that we are proposing. The deeper reason for this is, of 
course, that markets in the end react to what consumers do and not to 
how they feel.  
2.3 The question then arises, how consumer choice can be biased away 
from fully rational behaviour. Fundamentally there appear to be three 
different dimensions along which choice might be biased:  
• willingness to pay (WTP), consumers might pay too much for a given 
quantity of a good consumed 
• search, consumers might not find the cheapest or best suited product 
because they do not search in a rational manner, and 
• quality, consumers might purchase products ill-suited to their needs 
or of inferior quality. 
2.4 Within these three dimensions, it is useful to establish slightly finer 
categories that will allow us to say slightly more about how the bias 
operates. Specifically, we will suggest two finer categories for each of 
the three categories of choice bias. This gives us a total of six 
categories. The six categories are: 
2.5 Willingness to Pay and Reference Point Effects: A consumer’s WTP may 
be affected through reference point effects, that is, the consumer’s 
OFT1324   |  10
  
  
  
 
 
valuation of a good can depend on the status quo, past experiences, 
recently sampled products, or expectations. Wherever the reference 
point comes from, a deviation to something worse than the reference 
point is felt to a greater extent than a deviation to something better. It is 
this loss aversion that renders reference points significant. For example, 
if a consumer has just sampled a product that was available in a 
particularly beautiful colour, his WTP for a product in a slightly less 
appealing colour might drop below the WTP he would have had for this 
good had he not seen the perfect colour. Similarly, if the consumer’s 
reference price for a particular product is £5, then buying an identical 
product for £6 will cause more psychological harm to the consumer than 
buying an identical product for £4 would cause in joy.   
2.6 Willingness to Pay and Misperception of future desired quantities. 
Consumers might also pay too much for a good or service (despite 
having searched intensely) if they misperceive their own future demand. 
For example, they may believe that they will go more often to the gym 
than they will actually do. Or, they might buy too much food when going 
through the aisles of a supermarket when hungry. But, sometimes 
consumers might also under-predict their desire to consume, for 
example, their desire to use their credit cards for purchases that they 
essentially cannot afford. 
2.7 Search and Inertia. Consumers' search might be hindered by different 
forms of idiosyncratic inertia, that is, by subjectively high search costs. 
Subjectively high search costs can stem from many different sources. 
For example, consumers might be particularly attached to a specific 
supplier (perhaps even when the supplier offers products that are 
essentially identical to that of its competitors). Other reasons could 
include laziness or a psychological aversion against walking along 
crowded high streets. In all cases, the high search costs are a matter of 
preference.  
2.8 Search and Misjudgement of prices. The second search bias can arise 
even if consumers do engage in thorough search because they might 
misjudge prices that sellers quote. This may happen if pricing is 
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intrinsically complex but could also be a consequence of artificial 
presentational complexity. 
2.9 Quality and Misperception of desired product attributes. Consumers may 
misperceive the type of product they need, that is, they might think that 
certain product attributes are more important to them than they turn out 
to be ex-post. In other words, they misperceive horizontal quality 
differences between products.  
2.10 Quality and Misjudgement of vertical quality. Finally, in the presence of 
vertical product differentiation (that is, the same products but of higher 
and lower quality), consumers might misjudge the quality of a product 
they inspect and inadvertently a buy poor quality product.   
2.11 As we pointed out before, our six finer categories fall into three larger 
categories depending on which dimension of choice they affect: 
Willingness to pay, search, or quality. We illustrate this grouping based 
on consumer choice in Figure 2.1 which groups the six categories into 
these three consumer choice categories. 
Figure 2.1: Behavioural biases grouped according to how they affect 
choice 
 
Misperception of 
desired attributes 
Misjudgement of 
quality 
Misperception of 
desired quantities 
Reference points and 
loss aversion 
Quality biases 
WTP 
Misjudgement of 
prices 
 
Inertia 
Search biases 
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2.12 On the other hand, we can group our six categories according to their 
behavioural root causes. In this case there are two groups: (1) those that 
stem from errors in decision making; and, (2) those that arise due to 
preference formation. Biases that stem from errors in decision making 
are misjudgement of future quantities demanded, misperception of 
product attributes (horizontal quality), misjudgement of product quality 
(vertical quality) and misjudgement of price). Biases that stem from 
preference formation are reference point effects and loss aversion, and 
inertia. We show this in Figure 2.2 which groups the six categories by 
the two root causes; errors in decision making and errors in the way that 
consumers form their product preferences. 
Figure 2.2: Behavioural biases grouped according to their source 
 
2.13 We can group the six categories according to choice for empirical 
purposes, or according to the root cause of bias for understanding how 
robust they are and whether they can be solved through remedies. The 
categories can also be used in order to answer some of the key policy 
questions, for example, to tell us where increasing the number of 
competitors will improve market outcomes and where the presence of 
more competitors might have (counterintuitive) adverse effects for 
consumers. 
Misperception of 
desired attributes 
Misperception of 
desired quantities 
Misjudgement of 
quality 
Misjudgement of 
prices 
Errors in decision making 
Reference points and 
loss aversion 
 
Inertia 
Preference formation 
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2.14 Crucially, we will never need more than these six categories. All key 
results from the surveyed literature that are robust and relevant can be 
discussed with reference to these six simple categories. Or by reference 
to our higher groupings based on consumer choice or the root cause of 
the bias.  
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3 THE LITERATURE 
3.1 This chapter looks at the six different types of behavioural biases. First it 
looks at reference point effects. Next it looks at misperception of 
demand. Both of these can be classified more generally as willingness to 
pay biases. Third it looks at the two biases to optimal search behaviour 
– inertia and misjudgement of prices due to framing effects. Finally it 
looks at papers relating to the two biases regarding quality – 
misjudgement of quality required and misperception of demand for 
specific product attributes. 
Willingness-to-pay bias I: reference point effects 
3.2 This section looks at the resulting market equilibria when consumers do 
not have fixed preferences but rather have preferences that change 
given the context of their setting. 
3.3 The idea that economic decision makers might evaluate products or 
prospects relative to some reference points rather than in an absolute 
manner has been successfully introduced into the canon of economic 
thinking by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) for choice under risk and 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) for riskless choice. The basic idea is 
simple and psychologically appealing. Possible future outcomes are 
compared to the status quo. If the status quo moves, valuations of 
alternatives will change. Moreover, there is an asymmetry in the 
perception of gains and losses: Losses loom larger than gains. This is 
known as loss aversion. (Notice that without the 'kink' in the valuation 
of an item that is induced through loss aversion, a reference point would 
not affect choice. In other words, it is loss aversion that renders 
reference points economically important.) 
3.4 When consumers think about how much they are willing to pay for a 
particular good or service, it seems natural that they might be prone to 
similar reference effects. References might come from past experience, 
expectations, or recently sampled products. 
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3.5 While the studies that we survey in this chapter make subtly different 
assumptions about how reference points are formed (with some 
dramatic consequences for consumer demand), they do agree on one 
basic competition relevant insight: If consumers are loss averse in the 
price dimension (that is, if they feel 'heightened pain' moving from a 
cheaper to a more expensive product), this will generally intensify 
competition – much in the same way as competition becomes more 
intense when demand becomes more price elastic. In contrast, when 
consumers are loss averse in the dimension of product fit or product 
characteristic (that is, if they feel 'heightened pain' when moving from a 
product that fits their tastes more to one that fits their tastes less), this 
will soften competition – much in the same way as increased product 
differentiation does. 
3.6 One could summarise these effects of reference points by saying that 
loss aversion tends to serve as a magnifier of price and product 
differences. 
3.7 While loss aversion shifts consumers’ willingness to pay, it is important 
to notice that such shifts are not viewed as erroneous. The literature 
typically takes the stand that consumers evaluate outcomes relative to a 
reference point because this is what they prefer. These preferences may 
be non-standard but they are preferences, says the literature.2 However, 
these are preferences that open up the scope for firms to change 
consumers’ willingness to pay for their products. Consider for example a 
consumer who wants to buy a bottle of wine and considers two specific 
bottles, both of medium quality and price, but one a little finer and more 
expensive than the other. Reference point effects can imply that the 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the finer bottle depends on the 
presence of other bottles on the shelf that are not even under 
consideration for purchase. For example, the consumer might be willing 
to pay more for the finer bottle if there is a top quality bottle on the 
                                     
2 While we follow this line in this review, it is, however, worth pointing out that there is 
empirical evidence that suggests that the display of loss aversion correlates with low cognitive 
ability (low IQ); see, for example, Burks et al. (2008). 
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shelf, compared to the situation where a poor quality bottle is nestling 
next to the two bottles under consideration. The reason is that the third 
bottle (that the consumer would never buy) influences the consumer’s 
reference point and 'downgrading' quality would be perceived as a loss, 
while 'upgrading' quality would be perceived as a gain. Hence, if the 
reference point is shifted upwards (through the presence of the top 
quality bottle) the consumer may really want to avert the loss that 
comes with settling for the lesser bottle. On the other hand, if the 
reference point is shifted downwards (through the poor quality bottle) 
his extra willingness to pay for the gain that the finer bottle promises 
would be smaller. This explains why supermarkets may stock some 
expensive bottles that get dusty on the shelves. They may not be 
intended for selling but simply for shifting reference points or aspirations,  
3.8 Models of loss aversion have been firmly established in the economics 
literature for a long time, but there are only a few recent attempts to 
model competition between firms in the presence of loss averse 
consumers. These models differ in the way consumers form reference 
points but make the same assumptions about the domains of loss 
aversion. There are horizontally differentiated products and consumers 
may be loss averse with respect to prices and with respect to product 
fit. 
3.9 Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) assume that consumers compare products 
that they actually find in the market with their initial expectations about 
what the market will provide. Specifically, Heidhues and Koszegi assume 
that consumers have rational expectations about firms’ supply choices 
and prices.3 If a real product is more expensive or less suitable than what 
the consumer expected, the consumer will suffer an extra psychological 
loss (if she buys it) on top of the intrinsic loss. In the following 
discussion, let us temporarily ignore the loss aversion effect from the 
                                     
3 This requires consumers to compute the market equilibrium (which is, as the paper 
demonstrates, quite complicated). As a consequence, the rationality requirements for Heidhues 
and Koszegi’s model are even more demanding on consumers than those of most orthodox 
models. 
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product suitability dimension. The main ideas and results of their study 
do not depend on it. Also notice that in this literature about price 
competition and consumer loss aversion, the unit strength of loss 
aversion is exogenously given, but firms' price choices obviously will 
affect the distance between the reference point and the actual price and 
so will influence how much consumers suffer from loss aversion. 
3.10 Heidhues and Koszegi’s main results are intuitive. Specifically, they show 
that equilibria can arise where all firms, even if they have different costs, 
or when costs change over time, charge the same uniform ('focal') price. 
This effect is essentially driven by the loss aversion in the price 
dimension. The logic is as follows. Suppose consumers expect a uniform 
market price to prevail, then increasing the price by some increment 
affects demand more dramatically than reducing the price by the same 
increment. This is simply a consequence of the assumed loss aversion. 
Consumers react to losses (price increases) more sharply than to gains 
(price drops). This generates an outward kink in the demand curve with 
the kink being precisely at the expected ('focal') price. Profit-
maximisation then implies all firms should set actual price equal to the 
'focal' price even if their costs are different (up to some bound) or 
change over time. In other words, Heidhues and Koszegi’s model 
demonstrates that consumer loss aversion can give rise to price 
stickiness. 
3.11 However, the effect from consumer loss aversion on market prices will 
become weaker and weaker as the number of firms increases. With more 
firms the residual demand of each firm will become smaller. This requires 
the cost differences across firms to be relatively small in order to still 
give rise to focal pricing. In other words, price stickiness becomes less 
likely when the number of firms increases. 
3.12 Karle and Peitz (2009, 2010) study a variation of Heidhues and 
Koszegi’s model. They keep the assumption that (rational) expectations 
serve as reference points but assume that there are some fully informed 
consumers who do not experience loss aversion. Moreover, consumers 
who are not fully informed observe prices before they observe the 
quality match of the product (that is, how good it fits to their taste). 
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They show that Heidhues and Koszegi’s result on price stickiness is not 
immune to such changes. Rather than uniform 'focal' pricing they find 
that price differences increase in the number of loss averse consumers. 
3.13 Karle and Peitz also examine the question whether firms have an 
incentive to 'educate' consumers, for example, by advertising the 
precise nature of their product .This would turn uninformed consumers 
into informed consumers and would, hence, avoid loss aversion. They 
show that, while this would always be socially efficient, firms often do 
not have an incentive to engage in such prior disclosure. Only if 
disclosure leads to higher prices would firms engage in 'de-biasing' 
consumers through advertising quality. 
3.14 Finally, Karle and Peitz also show that loss aversion in the price 
dimension intensifies competition while loss aversion in the quality 
dimension softens competition.  
3.15 The same result is obtained by Zhou (2008) although in a different 
setting. Departing from the rational-expectation setting of the previous 
papers, Zhou assumes that reference points are formed during the 
consumer’s search process. Specifically, Zhou assumes that the first 
product seen by a consumer serves as the reference point for the next 
product that is inspected. Zhou focuses on the duopoly case and 
assumes that the order in which consumers search the two firms is 
given.4 One firm is more prominent than the other (on a similar theme, 
see the section on inertia) and is, hence, visited first and taken as the 
reference point by more consumers. 
3.16 Zhou obtains a similar result on how loss aversion amplifies competition 
when it is centred on price differentials and weakens competition when 
it is centred on product suitability. The intuition for this is the same as 
before.  
                                     
4 Zhou also endogenises the order in which consumers inspect products by considering 
advertising competition before firms engage in price competition. 
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3.17 However, Zhou’s results on consumer loss aversion and price volatility 
are opposed to Heidhues and Koszegi’s. Specifically, Zhou shows that if 
reference points are formed during the search process, the prominent 
firm’s demand curve displays an inward kink causing it to randomise its 
prices. In other words, Zhou’s model predicts that consumer loss 
aversion can give rise to price dispersion rather than price stickiness. The 
intuition for this result is as follow. If the prominent firm charges a lower 
price than its rival, then consumers take this low price as the reference 
point and loss aversion makes them more 'antagonistic' to the other 
firm’s high price, which increases the prominent firm’s demand by more 
than in the standard case. In other words, the prominent firm’s demand 
curve becomes steeper when its price is lower than its rival, so it has an 
inward kink at the rival’s price level. Given an inward kinked demand 
curve, the prominent firm has incentive to randomise its price between a 
low and a high one.5 The key difference of Zhou’s model from Heidhues 
and Koszegi’s is that in his model, a firm’s price choice can directly 
influence consumers’ reference point (and so their price sensitivity), 
while in Heidhues and Koszegi’s consumers take their rational 
expectation of the market price as the reference point, so no firm’s 
choice can affect it. This difference causes the opposite shapes of 
demand curves: one has an inward kink causing price dispersion, the 
other has an outward kink causing price stickiness. 
3.18 While the previous models discuss how reference point effects and loss 
aversion can drive actual pricing in markets, a recent empirical study by 
the OFT illustrated interesting theoretical implications concerning the 
optimal presentation of prices under loss aversion (OFT 2010). The 
authors show in an experiment that consumers pay higher prices (and 
search less) when the first shop they visit employs drip pricing, that is, 
first shows a low (base) price and only drips in additional (compulsory) 
charges when the consumer has decided to purchase the product. While 
the consumer can, of course, abort the purchasing process after being 
                                     
5 More precisely, the prominent firm’s isoprofit curve will now be tangent with its demand curve 
at two points: one has a price lower than its rival and the other has a price higher than its rival.  
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confronted with additional charges, (OFT 2010). Observe that 
consumers have a tendency to 'bite the bullet' and, as a consequence, 
are willing to pay higher prices under drip pricing compared to straight 
per-unit pricing. The authors analyse different possible reasons for this 
effect and conclude that it must stem from loss aversion. Upon seeing 
the low (base) price (which is indistinguishable from a low final price at 
this stage), consumers’ reference points apparently shift to thinking 
about the good as already bought. This implies that abandoning the 
purchase would be construed as a loss which raises consumers' 
willingness to pay. It is, of course, questionable whether this would be a 
stable phenomenon. Presumably, if this were to happen again and again, 
consumers would learn that the apparent bargain is none, such that the 
reference point should only shift when the actual total price is seen. This 
suggests that drip pricing would only be used to push up willingness to 
pay in markets for infrequently purchased goods or as part of an 
equilibrium where some but not all firms employ this method such that 
what looks like a bargain at least might be one. 
3.19 Summarising the literature on competition under reference point effects, 
we observe that the existing models’ predictions are extremely sensitive 
to the way reference points are formed, that is, whether they are formed 
through expectations as in Heidhues and Koszegi or through sampling as 
in Zhou. In the absence of robust empirical evidence, this suggests some 
of the models’ implications should be taken with care. Specifically, the 
question whether reference points cause more or less variation in prices 
cannot be viewed as settled. 
3.20 There are, however, some more robust policy-relevant findings. Loss 
aversion in the product suitability dimension softens competition which 
is why firms have little incentive to take measures that would reduce 
loss aversion in that dimension such as more detailed advertising of a 
product’s true characteristics. If consumers had complete information 
about all products’ characteristics at the beginning of the purchasing 
process, loss aversion would be rendered completely irrelevant and all 
consumers would benefit from more intense competition. 
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3.21 In regard to the effect of increasing the number of firms (for example, 
through lowering barriers to entry), all existing results suggest that 
consumers will benefit from this as in most orthodox models.6  
Willingness-to-pay bias II: misperception of demand 
3.22 This section looks at how consumers’ mistakes or misperceptions of 
their demand can distort market equilibria. There are a comparatively 
large number of papers surveyed here are characterised by introducing 
consumers who, due to some reason or other, misperceive the quantities 
they would like to consume of a given good at given a price. They may 
over- or underestimate their actual demand. These misperceptions may 
arise from a number of deeper psychological roots that we will discuss 
below. 
3.23 A common basic insight from this category of models is that firms will 
cater to consumers’ misperception. Consequently, allocative 
inefficiencies will arise in these markets ex-post when the actual true 
demand is realised. These allocative inefficiencies (such as, for example, 
distorted prices or waste) cannot be overcome through competition 
(precisely because competition is driven by what consumers want 
initially). Increasing the number of firms in such environments can never 
eradicate these inefficiencies completely. However, increased 
competition usually makes consumers better off. After all, consumers 
still seek the best deal that they can get. Hence, entry of additional firms 
will imply that there is fiercer competition for consumers’ business.  
3.24 In the following we will illustrate the basic mechanics of misperception 
through two simple models. We will then discuss the different papers 
                                     
6 A subtle point is that if consumers display stronger loss aversion in the price dimension than in 
the product suitability dimension (so, if the number of firms is fixed, loss aversion has a positive 
effect on consumers by intensifying price competition), then increasing the number of firms has 
a negative effect on consumer surplus since it weakens the loss aversion effect. But this 
negative effect is outweighed by the usual positive competition effect.  
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offered in the literature in a little more detail and finally turn to common 
policy-relevant implications. 
3.25 In order to illustrate how over predicting own demand can affect market 
outcomes, consider a simple model where a monopolist uses linear 
pricing and a consumer overestimates the quantity he actually desires. 
Such a model is explicitly developed in Annex B, Box 1 and its 
accompanying figure. The key driving force in such a model is that 
consumers order larger amounts of a certain good or service than they 
will actually need, that is, the demand function shifts outwards. Once 
actual demand materialises itself, the model assumes that firms will only 
deliver the quantity that is actually required, not the quantity ordered. 
This implies that the price paid for units that are not consumed becomes 
a pure transfer of surplus from consumers to firms. The assumption that 
these extra units are not delivered is particularly appealing in markets for 
services, say, the consumer who bought a big mobile phone package 
just never causes the traffic he has paid for. For physical goods, one 
could imagine that consumers would mostly take delivery of everything 
they ordered as long as there is free disposal. However, there may be 
large or heavy items (say, bricks for building a house) where the 
consumer would be happy not to take delivery of units she does not 
need. Generally, these models are, however, more appealing for markets 
for services. 
3.26 The model shows how the monopolist’s price increases in costs (as 
usual) and the degree of overestimation. It also shows how the 
deadweight loss increases in the overestimation parameter and how it 
exceeds the deadweight loss under rational expectations. 
3.27 We can also examine the case of perfect competition in the same 
situation. The simple model shows how allocative inefficiencies would 
still arise. The reason is as follows. If price were equal to marginal costs, 
firms would still make a positive profit through a simple transfer of 
money from consumers to firms (the amounts they pay for units the firm 
need not deliver). Hence, under perfect competition (in which the zero-
profit condition must be satisfied in equilibrium) prices would fall below 
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marginal costs and there would be an inefficiency arising from 
overproduction. 
3.28 While this model captures the essential intuition and indeed the essential 
mechanics in markets where at least some consumers mispredict their 
own demand, the surveyed papers differ substantially in the stories they 
tell, specifically in where the misperceptions stem from. The lesson 
obtained from comparing these studies is, however, that, from a 
practical perspective, it is not so important after all what the precise 
source of the misperception is. 
3.29 The sources discussed are hyperbolic discounting (DellaVigna and 
Malmendier 2004 and 2006) where consumers tend to put too much 
weight on the present moment, or other forms of time-inconsistent 
preferences (Eliaz and Spiegler 2006, and Heidhues and Koszegi 2010); 
overconfidence (Grubb 2009, and Sandroni and Squintani 2007) where 
consumers think they can handle their lives better than they actually 
can; and, finally, unawareness or limited attention (Gabaix and Laibson 
2006) where consumers might overlook the prices of essential 
components of a complex consumption bundle. 
3.30 These underlying biases may affect the individuals in a variety of ways. 
The over-optimists may, for example, exert too much or too little effort 
at the workplace depending on how incentives are designed and people 
who suffer from time-inconsistencies and self-control problems may 
delay quitting smoking or going on a diet or starting a new fitness regime 
from one day to the next and then again to the day after. However, all 
that matters for competition among firms is that, if individuals are 
affected by these biases, they might behave as consumers who 
mispredict the quantities of goods that they plan to consume.  
3.31 The hyperbolic discounters (for whom the present is always a little too 
important) think they will, from tomorrow, go to the gym more often 
than they will actually do. Similarly, they will also be convinced that, 
from tomorrow, they will cease buying luxury goods on credit cards that 
they cannot afford (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004 and 2006). Or they 
will think they will repay their consumer debt before incurring penalties 
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but then will not because of the sudden desire for more liquidity 
(Heidhus and Koszegi 2010).  
3.32 The overconfident may have unrealistically precise estimates of their 
future demand for making mobile phone calls when in reality demand 
fluctuates much more wildly (Grubb 2009), and may underestimate the 
amount of insurance that they need. In the extreme, unawareness might 
imply that consumers completely neglect their need for certain products, 
for example, add-ons that improve the performance of a basic good 
(Gabaix and Laibson 2006). 
3.33 Firms will not particularly care about these underlying roots of 
misperception. What matters to them is how these root biases affect 
demand. One may think that it is obvious that firms can exploit 
consumers who predict that they will consume more than they will 
actually do, but it is perhaps slightly less intuitive to see why consumers 
can suffer (and firms benefit) from under-predicting future demand. In 
Annex B, Box 2, we sketch again a simple model that illustrates the 
logic. Essentially, when consumers initially think they will not need much 
of a certain good or service, the firm can exploit the fact that, once the 
initial quantity demanded turns out to be insufficient, the consumer will 
come back and demand more. This puts the firm into a position where it 
can price discriminate between infra-marginal units.  
3.34 One of the first papers that models misperception resulting from an 
underlying behavioural bias is DellaVigna and Malmendier’s (2004) study 
of optimal contract design for firms selling to consumers with self-
control problems. The idea is that consumers never like to incur pain 
immediately but are always keen to have pleasures now. Of course, this 
is true for any agent who discounts the future but the consumers 
studied here are very extreme in how much weight they put on the 
present. They have an immediacy bias and value today over tomorrow 
much more than tomorrow over the day after. This causes 
inconsistencies in behaviour and gives rise to behavioural patterns 
where, for example, a smoker decides on any given day that he will give 
up tomorrow and is known in the literature as (quasi) hyperbolic 
discounting (see, for example, Laibson 1997).  
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3.35 As such hyperbolic discounting is just a preference and not a hindrance 
in the market place. However, as soon as consumers are unaware of 
their immediacy bias, they will mispredict their demand for certain types 
of goods. A consumer who knows that she is a hyperbolic discounter 
and, say, plans to go to the gym regularly from tomorrow will 
understand that she will actually not do it. Hence, she will not pay for an 
expensive all-inclusive memberships that, in contrast, a consumer who 
has an immediacy bias and is unaware of this fact might decide to 
purchase.  
3.36 For goods that create pleasure now and pain later (say, credit card 
purchases of luxuries) the naïve hyperbolic discounter will underestimate 
her demand. DellaVigna and Malmendier call such goods 'leisure goods.' 
For goods that come with pain now and pleasure later (say, a hard-body 
that requires exercising in the gym) she will overestimate her demand. 
The authors call these goods 'investment goods.' 
3.37 The main finding of DellaVigna and Malmendier’s analysis is that firms 
will design contracts that cater to consumers’ misperception. In case of 
overestimation (investment goods), they will set high fixed fees and low 
per-usage charges such that a biased consumer who over estimates her 
usage will think that the average price she will pay is quite low while, in 
fact, it will be much higher. An example would be the already mentioned 
all-inclusive memberships at a gym with a substantial annual fee and 
zero charges per visit. 
3.38 The opposite strategy is optimal when consumers underestimate demand 
(leisure goods). Here the firm will set a very low (perhaps even negative) 
fixed fee but a per-usage price that is higher than marginal costs. An 
example would be a credit card that comes with a free gift initially (say a 
zero-interest balance transfer) and high interest rates for not fully paid 
bills or other charges. In such environments, sophisticated consumers 
(who are either not biased at all or are aware of their bias)7 may switch 
                                     
7 A consumer who is aware of his bias will anticipate his future demand correctly and can, 
hence, adjust his behaviour optimally (for example, through committing to paying of credit card 
bills via direct debit). 
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from one credit card to another but those who are unaware of their bias 
will not, that is, they will succumb to the temptation of buying yet 
another luxury good they cannot afford without having planned for that 
in the form of a new credit card with a cheap initial rate. 
3.39 From a welfare perspective, it is important to notice that these 
distortions in the contract design can actually benefit sophisticated 
consumers. They can enjoy zero-interest balance transfer and avoid 
costly charges by paying their bills on time. (For an empirical study of 
credit card markets that contains this logic, see Ausubel 1991). 
Similarly, the avid gym goer can indeed achieve a very low price per visit 
(and use the contract effectively as a commitment device). 
3.40 For the reasons already discussed above (that is, firms will compete to 
cater to consumers’ misperception), competition cannot eliminate the 
allocation inefficiency in such markets. But consumers (even naïve ones) 
can benefit from increased competition. For example, profits from the 
high marginal price for a luxury good might be competed away by 
setting negative fixed fees such as providing free gifts. The extent to 
which this will happen depends crucially on the underlying parameters of 
a market, for example, the extent to which there exists some form of 
product differentiation as well as on the precise number of firms. 
3.41 Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) essentially generalise the analysis of DellaVigna 
and Malmendier. They consider markets with many different degrees of 
naiveté and allow for more complicated tariffs. They show that, while 
the fundamental insights from DellaVigna and Malmendier still hold in 
this setting, firms will offer different contracts to screen consumers. One 
contract will essentially commit consumers to a specific consumption 
profile and will be taken by the relatively sophisticated. The other 
contract will exploit the more naïve consumers’ misprediction pretty 
much in the same manner as the contracts discussed by DellaVigna and 
Malmendier. Namely, the contract will typically consist of a non-linear 
pricing scheme with a low price for some action and a high price for 
another. The biased consumers will expect to pay the low price only but 
then discover that they actually want the more expensive option. 
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3.42 While this paper focuses on the monopoly case, it appears that 
competition will not change the nature of the contracts and, hence, not 
eliminate the fundamental allocative inefficiencies. However, once again 
naïve consumers should benefit from competition as firms will try to 
attract them with lower prices for the action they predict they will take. 
3.43 Another paper that examines markets with consumers who suffer from 
the self-control issue is Heidhues and Koszegi (2010). Their approach is 
very similar to both previous papers but tailored towards a credit market 
setting and assumes perfect competition. Consumers underestimate their 
future demand for liquidity which implies they overestimate their ability 
to pay back loans. As a consequence, banks offer loans that are cheap if 
paid back on time but expensive when not. Biased consumers think they 
will pay the loan back on time but may fail to do so. As they 
underestimate the true costs of taking out loans, they will also borrow 
more than they should which creates substantial welfare losses. This 
occurs even under perfect competition as the same argument from 
above applies here: The market caters to consumers’ misperceptions. 
3.44 In Grubb (2009) consumers neither over or underestimate their expected 
demand, rather they underestimate the variance of their demand. They 
are overconfident about their ability to predict their precise demand. 
Firms can exploit this overconfidence by offering three-part tariffs, that 
is, a fixed fee, a low price for the first units (which can potentially be 
zero) and a higher price for more units. A consumer with higher variance 
than expected will not put enough weight on the two scenarios where 
consumption is considerably below or considerably above expectations. 
A three-part tariff can exploit both these mistakes. In the former case 
(where demand is actually very low) the consumer will still have to pay 
the fixed fee and in the latter case (where demand is actually quite big) 
the consumer will pay the high price for extra units. In both cases, the 
average price per unit paid is considerably higher than for medium 
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demand where the fixed fee is spread across several units of 
consumption and the high price for extra units does not kick in.8 
3.45 Overconfidence as a source of misprediction is also studied in Sandroni 
and Squintani’s (2007) analysis of insurance markets. Building on the 
classic Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model, they study a case with 
three types of consumers, the standard low-risk consumer, the standard 
high-risk consumer, and a biased consumer who is high-risk but 
mistakenly believes she is low-risk and, thus, misperceives her demand 
for insurance. 
3.46 The existence of the behavioural type has significant consequences for 
the entire market since insurers cannot distinguish real low-risk types 
from the overconfident type who only thinks she is low-risk. There is 
simply no visible sign that would make the biased consumer identifiable. 
If there were such a sign or if insurance companies could run a simple 
test to identify the existence of the bias, this would, of course, change 
matters. But, in the absence of such signals, the fact that the 
overoptimistic are indistinguishable from the true low-risk consumers will 
drive up the insurance premium for the low-risk contract and, thus, harm 
the true low-risk consumer. After all, the insurer needs to cover his 
actual average costs from the contract and the biased consumers will 
simply have more or bigger claims than the true low-risk consumers. The 
same is true if insurance is made compulsory. 
3.47 We end this subsection with a discussion of another modern classic, the 
study by Gabaix and Laibson (2006) who focus on the most extreme 
case of misperception of own demand considered in the literature – the 
case where (some) consumers are completely unaware that they will 
demand a certain product.  
                                     
8 The lowest average price is, of course, realized if demand equals exactly the amount of units 
for which the low price is charged, for example, if it equals exactly the amount of free minutes 
that come with a mobile phone package. 
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3.48 How can such complete unawareness harm a consumer? If I am 
unaware of Coca-Cola presumably, I will simply never drink it and this 
will mainly harm the supplier. So, for ordinary goods firms will find it 
impossible to exploit such unawareness. On the contrary, they will 
engage in activities to overcome it, such as informative advertising. 
3.49 However, if the good the consumer is unaware of is a strong 
complement to another (base) good she intends to consume, the picture 
changes drastically. Now, the consumer might discover his desire for the 
complementary good once he has purchased and/or consumed the base 
good. Gabaix and Laibson assume that at least some consumers in the 
population do not anticipate their desire for the complementary good 
when they are considering purchasing the base good. For example, some 
consumers may not realize that they need room service once they check 
in the hotel. (That is why the paper falls into the category of 
misperceived demand.) 
3.50 Gabaix and Laibson assume that firms always advertise the price of the 
basic good but have the choice whether to advertise the add-on price or 
instead to shroud it. There are sophisticated consumers who will have 
rational expectations about the add-on price even if it is not advertised 
and there are biased consumers who are initially unaware of the add-on 
but would learn about its existence and, thus, their own desire to 
consume it if it were advertised. Moreover, sophisticated consumers 
have the ability to exert effort to avoid the add-on (they can buy a meal 
elsewhere if they find room service to expensive) while biased 
consumers are assumed to consume the add-on once they have 
purchased/consumed the basic good which triggers their discovery of 
the desirable add-on for which they now do not have an alternative (for 
example, because all shops where one could buy a simple sandwich as 
substitute for room service are now shut). 
3.51 The main result of the paper is that, if there are sufficiently many 
unaware consumers, firms will not advertise the add-on even if 
advertising had zero costs. Instead, they will offer low prices for the 
basic good and charge inflated prices for the add-on. In other words, 
they will systematically exploit the unawareness by charging 
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comparatively low prices for the basic good and inflated prices for the 
add-on. The reason for this is simple enough. Sophisticated consumers 
will avoid an overly expensive add-on and advertising the price of it 
('unshrouding') will turn a biased unaware consumer who does buy it 
into a sophisticated one. Moreover, the firm also has little chance to 
adopt a different pricing strategy - advertising a lower priced add-on and 
compensating for that through a (slightly) higher base price - as all the 
sophisticated consumers would then prefer to buy from a firm that does 
shroud and offers the attractive lower base price.  
3.52 In this scenario biased consumers cross-subsidise sophisticated 
consumers who are able to find useful substitutes for the add-on while 
enjoying the basic good at a low price. This result is robust to even very 
intense competition. Competition will lower the base price since both 
sophisticated and naïve consumers compare sellers according to the 
offered base prices, but competition will not affect the add-on price 
since, once a naïve consumer chooses a seller, she can only buy the 
add-on from that firm and so the firm will act as a local monopolist. Of 
course, to what extent competition can reduce the base price (and so 
the profits from add-ons will be competed away) depends on how 
differentiated the base products are across sellers. 
3.53 The question whether rational consumers, that is, those who predict 
their demand accurately, will benefit or suffer from the presence of 
biased consumers is a theme common to the entire strand of the 
literature. Unfortunately, there is no general answer to this question. 
When firms use nonlinear pricing schemes rational consumers with truly 
high demand can, for example, benefit from subscribing to an 'all-
inclusive' (gym) plan which offers them very low effective prices per 
visit. In essence, biased consumers cross subsidize rational consumers in 
this kind of market. However, rational consumers can also suffer from 
the misperception of others. For example, in the case of (high-risk) 
consumers underestimating the amount of insurance needed, this can 
push up the price of insurance paid by real low-risk consumers. 
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3.54 In terms of policy, we have seen that the standard intuition that 
increasing the number of firms will benefit consumers still holds even 
though allocative distortions might not fully disappear.  
3.55 In contrast to the WTP biases discussed in part 1 above, misperception 
of demand discussed in part 2 is due to erroneous reasoning and can as 
such improve through learning. In all models discussed in this second 
part of the section on WTP biases, consumers are, ex post, aware of 
their mistake. They learn that they do not go to the gym as often as they 
thought they would; they can see that they have unspent free minutes 
on their mobile phone contracts; and they might regret not having 
bought a sandwich when they order expensive room service. 
Consequently, time itself should improve consumers’ ability to predict 
their demand more accurately. If this is true, the pricing strategies 
discussed here should be more prevalent in markets for comparatively 
new products or in markets that have a constant inflow of 
unsophisticated 'first-time' buyers. 
Search bias I: inertia 
3.56 The next category of papers reviewed in this survey concerns models 
where consumers exhibit a tendency to purchase at the first shop they 
visit or, if they purchase repeatedly, stay at their current provider. The 
orthodox economics literature has paid considerable attention to such 
models assuming that consumers have search or switching costs. Often 
these costs reflect material costs in terms of time or travel expense that 
consumers have to bear when they want to find a (new) supplier and, as 
far as this remains a plausible assumption for fully rational consumers, 
these models fall outside the scope of this survey.  
3.57 However, several of these classical papers appear more realistic when 
one interprets high levels of search costs stemming from some kind of 
'unhealthy' inertia. Of course, if modelled as costs, inertia is stemming 
from a preference, and laziness is justified through very high valuations 
of search time saved. While this survey is not the place to discuss the 
philosophical issues behind this distinction, we think it is important to 
incorporate this classic on-its-surface-orthodox literature as it highlights 
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many distinct features of markets where consumers do not search 
'properly'. 
3.58 Specifically, we will discover one of the most fundamental results in the 
literature surveyed here, namely that increasing the number of firms, for 
example, through easing entry, can actually have adverse consequences 
for consumers. Essentially, the logic for this result is that, as soon as 
some consumers do not search properly, firms no longer have a clear 
incentive to compete by offering better deals. Rather, an alternative 
strategy arises which offers low value items to consumers who do not 
engage in adequate search (in Part 1 because of their inertia and further 
down below in Part 2 because of misjudging the prices of products). 
Classic search papers 
3.59 Several of the classical studies on consumer search explicitly justify their 
approaches by alluding to behavioural biases or bounded rationality of 
consumers. For example, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) write in the 
introduction of their seminal paper on 'bargains and rip-offs': 'Most 
people do not understand even the simple laws of probability; […] Many 
people do not calculate unit-prices in the supermarket.' 
3.60 Salop and Stiglitz assume that consumer search reveals all prices in the 
market, that is, search is simultaneous. They show how consumers with 
high search costs can have negative externalities for consumers with 
low search costs, namely when the inertia of some consumers leads to 
average cost pricing (similar to monopolistic competition). However, 
different types of market equilibria can arise and consumers with low 
search costs benefit from those that display price dispersion In equilibria 
with price dispersion some firms will charge low prices and consumers 
with low search costs are likely to find these firms. 
3.61 The intuition for equilibria with price dispersion can be obtained in three 
steps. First, notice that undercutting a high price slightly does not 
generate extra demand from consumers who do not search (and no extra 
demand at all if the price cut is small and all consumers have at least 
some small search costs). Second, marginal price increases do not 
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necessarily reduce demand and this pushes prices upward. Third, once 
prices are really high large price cuts might be profitable as they would 
attract all consumers with low search costs. Hence, firms either want to 
edge prices upwards or drastically undercut which will result in price 
dispersion.  
3.62 Price dispersion is also obtained in Varian’s (1980) search model where 
some consumers are informed and others completely uninformed. Firms 
have to balance the desire to compete for informed consumers with the 
temptation to exploit inert consumers. Annex B, Box 3 presents a simple 
model of Varian-type search models.  
3.63 It is this need to balance that creates price dispersion in these models. In 
Varian’s model there are, in fact, no symmetric pure strategy equilibria 
because at any common price level firms could slightly undercut and 
gain all informed consumers, rather than having to share them. This 
'Bertrand force' drives prices down but at very low prices firms would 
have an incentive to charge really high prices instead to make profit from 
uninformed inert consumers. In other words, it is never optimal to charge 
the same price as your competitor does. If your competitor charges a 
comparatively high price you want to marginally undercut, if he charges 
a sufficiently low price you want to charge a really high price. Hence, 
there are no equilibria where all firms charge the same price.  
3.64 Both these classic papers, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Varian (1980) 
assume a zero-profit condition so that any rents obtained from 
uninformed inert consumers are competed away. However, inefficiencies 
can arise from the fact that too many small firms might produce in the 
region of decreasing average costs such that total output could be 
produced more efficiently by shifting it to larger firms. 
3.65 The effect that inert consumers have on the welfare of informed 
consumers is ambiguous in these models and generally depends on the 
precise nature of equilibria. With more uninformed consumers entering a 
market, Varian’s model predicts an increase in price dispersion from 
which informed consumers will gain. There are simply more firms 
charging lower prices which are observable for the informed consumers. 
OFT1324   |  34
  
  
  
 
 
Similarly, in the equilibria with price dispersion identified by Salop and 
Stiglitz, the fully competitive price will be charged by some firms which 
can be located by the informed consumers.  
3.66 While these models of consumer search capture an important 
behavioural element and highlight important market consequences (such 
as the possibility of price dispersion for a homogenous good), a more 
realistic class of models will assume sequential search where consumers 
pay finite search costs each time they look up a different supplier 
instead of incurring search costs only once for observing all prices 
charged by all suppliers.  
3.67 Such sequential search is studied by Stahl (1989) who also assumes 
that there are two types of consumers, those who are ‘shoppers’ with 
zero search costs (the same as the informed consumers in Varian’s 
model) and others who find search costly (in equilibrium they will behave 
as the uninformed consumer in Varian’s model, that is, they only sample 
one firm). Stahl’s paper is important for three reasons. The first pertains 
to the orthodox literature on search (which we do not survey in full) by 
showing how both the Betrand paradox and the Diamond paradox can be 
obtained 'smoothly' by varying population parameters. More specifically, 
if the fraction of ‘shoppers’ tends to one (that is, when we move to 
situation with zero search costs for everybody), then firms will undercut 
intensively such that equilibrium prices approach the marginal cost (the 
Betrand paradox); if the fraction of ‘shoppers’ tends to zero (so all 
consumers will have a positive search cost), then all firms will charge 
the monopoly price and consumers will only sample one firm (the 
Diamond paradox). The intuition for the latter is that if some firm is 
charging a price lower than the monopoly one, then it always has an 
incentive to raise its price slightly, say, by an amount smaller than the 
search cost because doing that will not induce any consumers to leave 
and the firm will earn more from each existing consumer. 
3.68 The second reason for the importance of Stahl’s paper (and which is 
more relevant for our purposes here) is that he shows that prices can 
increase if the number of firms increases. The reason is that with more 
and more competitors, firms face, in a mixed strategy equilibrium, an 
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even smaller probability of being the cheapest firm which reduces the 
incentive to charge low prices.9  
3.69 The welfare effect of increased competition is ambiguous in Stahl’s 
model. While fully informed consumers benefit from the presence of 
more firms, those that experience costly search are worse off. (The 
same is true in the Varian model if we give up free entry.) In both cases, 
the reason for this result is that there is more price dispersion which 
makes it more likely for informed consumers to see good prices but 
makes search less effective for others. Consequently, the total welfare 
effect depends on the composition of consumers with bleaker 
consequences when there are more consumers for whom search is 
costly. 
3.70 The final reason why Stahl’s paper is important for this survey is that his 
model serves as a blueprint for various recent studies, several of which 
deal with non-standard consumer behaviour. 
Complexity and inflated consumer search costs 
3.71 From the viewpoint of behavioural economics, the most intriguing 
models that build on the classic search literature are those that assume 
that firms can effectively influence search costs. While these papers 
retain an orthodox flavour in their modelling approach (all agents choose 
rationally and have rational equilibrium beliefs), the very idea that firms 
might influence search costs through the design of their stores or 
through the framing of prices has a behavioural core. For a fully rational 
consumer it does not matter whether he compares two prices that are 
framed in the same or different ways and a fully rational consumer does 
not get mentally tired if he searches for a longer time. 
3.72 Using the Stahl framework, Ellison and Wolitzky (2009) assume that 
firms can make in-store search more costly for non-shoppers through 
increasing the complexity of prices. This assumption is coupled with an 
                                     
9 A similar result had been obtained earlier by Rosenthal (1980) for a variant of Varian’s model. 
OFT1324   |  36
  
  
  
 
 
assumption of increasing marginal search costs (the non-shopper gets 
increasingly 'tired' as the search progresses in the sense that if she has 
paid a higher search cost in the first store, visiting the second store 
becomes more costly). Ellison and Wolitzky’s most important result 
concerns comparative statics with respect to variations in between-store 
search costs. For example, search between stores might become easier 
in the presence of price search engines. Ellison and Wolitzky show that, 
in equilibrium, firms will offset this reduction in between-store search 
costs through increasing price complexity within stores, thereby 
completely neutralising the effect of easier search between stores. 
3.73 Notice that in Ellison and Wolitzky’s model consumers cannot observe 
the in-store search cost in each firm directly and they will find it out only 
if they reach the store. Since consumers hold equilibrium beliefs that all 
firms set the same in-store search cost, they will visit firms in a random 
order and a firm’s unilateral deviation (for example, reducing its in-store 
search cost) cannot influence consumers’ search orders. (See Wilson 
(2010) below for a different assumption about the observability of in-
store search costs.) 
3.74 Another paper where firms choose prices and their complexity 
simultaneously is Carlin (2009). However, in contrast to Ellison and 
Wolitzky who build on Stahl’s model, Carlin adapts Varian’s model 
where, eventually, some consumers will search the entire market and 
become fully informed, while others will not search at all. Firms’ choice 
of price complexity is influencing consumers’ search costs. The more 
complex the prices chosen by firms the more difficult becomes search. 
And, as search becomes more difficult, an increasing number of 
consumers will decide to remain uninformed. In other words, firms can 
and will soften competition through complex price schemes.  
3.75 A key result obtained by Carlin is that increasing competition through 
more firms will increase each firm’s incentive to resort to more complex 
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pricing schemes. As a consequence, equilibrium prices can increase in 
the number of competitors.10  
3.76 There is another interesting behavioural element in Carlin’s study. In 
equilibrium, there is a positive correlation between price and price 
complexity, yet uninformed consumers do not make any inference from 
the presentation of a price, that is, they do not understand that 
complicated prices are likely to be high prices. 
3.77 It should perhaps be added here that both papers, Ellison and Wolitzky’s 
and Carlin’s, simply assume that there is such a variable as price 
complexity which makes the consumers’ problem harder. Empirical 
evidence available on the link between price complexity and the quality 
of consumer choice is discussed in OFT 2010 (see paragraph 3.103). 
3.78 While firms choose prices and complexity simultaneously in the last two 
studies that we discussed, Wilson (2010) assumes that firms first 
choose price complexity (or more generally, how difficult they make 
search) and, only after that is observed by their competitors and by 
consumers, choose prices. Consumers choose the order in which they 
search suppliers after having observed price complexity. Analysing the 
duopoly case,11 Wilson shows that asymmetric equilibria can arise where 
one firm obfuscates and the other does not. The incentive for 
obfuscation is subtle: by deliberately refraining from attracting 
consumers with high search costs (who will shun the obfuscating firm), 
competition for the remaining informed consumers is softened simply 
because the competing firm (that now attracts the consumers who avoid 
the obfuscating firm) has an incentive to charge higher prices. Wilson’s 
study is also interesting from a conceptual point of view as it belongs to 
the small set of papers that examines non-random search sequences. In 
                                     
10 Ellison and Wolitzky, discussed earlier, assume an infinite number of firms and, hence, do not 
study this question.) 
11 Wilson does not analyse markets with more than two firms, presumably because the price 
subgame becomes very difficult to analyse. 
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traditional search models firms look identical ex ante and, hence, 
consumers have no choice but to search them in random order. In 
Wilson’s study, consumers can choose a search sequence because firms 
differ in an observable dimension, the complexity or accessibility of their 
price schemes. 
Non-random consumer search 
3.79 In random search models asymmetric outcomes (say, where firms charge 
different prices for identical goods) are typically viewed as stemming 
from a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, that is, the asymmetries 
only arise ex post as realisations of the randomisation. However, this is 
at odds with persistent asymmetries in many markets where, for 
example, certain firms are simply more prominent than others. 
3.80 Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009) tackle the issue of prominence in a 
search framework. Consumers are assumed always to start their search 
with one particular prominent firm. There are many (partly behavioural) 
reasons for justifying such an assumption. Consumers with limited 
attention might first look at prominently displayed products at the 
beginning of an aisle in a supermarket. Or it might be natural to start a 
search process on the internet by first clicking on the top result that a 
search engine delivers.  
3.81 Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou consider a search framework with 
horizontal product differentiation, where consumers need to search for 
both lower prices and higher product suitability. They show that, if there 
are no systematic quality differences across firms, the prominent firm 
charges a lower price than its non-prominent rivals, and the presence of 
a prominent firm harms consumers and total welfare. As consumers 
search for horizontally differentiated products, any non-prominent firm 
that is visited by a consumer knows that the consumer must have been 
dissatisfied with the prominent firm's offering. The fact that the 
consumer was unsatisfied is information which conveys some monopoly 
power to the non-prominent firm, and that is the reason why the 
prominent firm’s price is lower than the non-prominent firms’. (In models 
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of random search order such information is never conveyed as firms do 
not observe buyers’ search order.) 
3.82 Consumer surplus and total welfare decrease when some firm becomes 
more prominent than others mainly because the unequal prices across 
firms caused by non-random consumer search induce consumers to stop 
searching too early, which reduces the match efficiency (that is, 
consumers stop searching at the prominent firm too often because of its 
low price even if they have not found a sufficiently satisfactory product). 
However, industry profits rise when a firm becomes prominent and 
profits are shared more unequally among firms with the prominent firm 
(despite charging lower prices than others) receiving the largest share. 
Industry profits increase mainly because non-prominent firms raise their 
prices more than the prominent firm reduces its price. (The prominent 
firm reduces its price relatively little because all non-prominent firms are 
now charging higher prices.)12 
3.83 In this non-random search model with prominence, increasing the 
number of firms will improve consumer welfare. This is not only because 
of the standard competition effect (that is, more firms lead to lower 
prices) but also because with more firms the price discrepancy between 
the prominent and the non-prominent firms shrinks, which mitigates the 
match efficiency loss we discussed before. 
3.84 With non-negligible search costs, firms have an incentive to be the first 
that consumer visits. This is true in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou but 
holds more generally. As a consequence firms might compete in other 
dimensions to influence consumers’ search order. Depending on the 
nature of this competition, welfare outcomes can be better or worse. If 
sellers try to attract consumers by offering and advertising another 
product very cheaply, some of the extra profits that search costs convey 
to firms will be redistributed to consumers. If on the other hand, firms 
compete for consumers’ attention through (wasteful) advertising, firms’ 
                                     
12 Notice that prominence is exogenous in this analysis. A natural extension would be to study 
competition for prominence. 
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rents might be competed away without any additional benefit for 
consumers. This point is formally made by Hann and Moraga-Gonzalez 
(2009) in a search framework with (attention-grabbing) advertising 
competition. 
Inertia in repeated purchase 
3.85 The idea that firms may compete vigorously in order to attract 
consumers first is, of course, also familiar from Klemperer’s (1987) 
seminal analysis of markets with switching costs. Even earlier it can be 
found in Selten’s (1965) model of an oligopoly with demand inertia.  
3.86 Selten models an oligopoly where firms compete repeatedly for a finite 
number of periods for the same consumers. Consumers tend to stay 
with the same firm as long as price differences are not too high, that is, 
they switch from one supplier to another only when they get frustrated 
by prices that, in comparison, appear excessive. Selten shows that, 
while firms will eventually exploit their customers' inertia, they will 
compete vigorously early on. They make, however, still substantially 
greater overall profits than they would in the absence of inertia.  
3.87 We should not end this first part on search biases without briefly alluding 
to the reference point effects we discussed previously as shifting 
consumers’ WTP. In environments where consumers search sequentially, 
a loss averse consumer may be less likely to continue her search after 
having sampled a product with particularly good fit. In that respect, loss 
aversion also causes inertia. The difference is, however, that the loss 
averse consumer might not even buy an ex ante more attractive 
alternative if it were shown to her for free after she inspected the first 
good.  
3.88 Lowering search costs through increasing market transparency does not 
fundamentally affect competition in the presence of loss averse 
consumers (only full transparency at the very beginning of the 
purchasing process would), but it improves market performance in 
environments discussed in this section. If search becomes easier, more 
consumers will seek out better deals, which generates a welcome 
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competitive pressure on firms. However, as we have seen, firms might 
react to such improvements through making in-store search more 
difficult or active obfuscation. The extent to which this is a viable 
strategy for firms will depend on the specifics of the market. For 
example, it would be much harder for a fruit and vegetable dealer to 
make pricing more complicated than it would be for sellers of electronic 
equipment that comes with a multitude of accessories. 
3.89 Moreover, we find that increasing the number of firms can hurt 
consumers in the presence of inertia while this has not been shown to 
be possible for loss aversion.  
Search bias II: misjudgement of prices caused by framing effect and 
limited memory 
3.90 If consumers face the choice between two identical products that they 
see at the same time, the standard assumption and indeed the standard 
intuition is that they will choose the one that is cheaper. When they 
instead have to engage in search to find out about prices, the 
assumption is that they will memorise prices and choose the one that 
minimises the sum of (expected) price and (expected) search costs. For 
example, if they have searched the entire market, the intuition is that 
they will either pick the last one that they have seen or will return to a 
cheaper supplier provided that the extra (transaction or travel) costs 
offsets the price difference. 
3.91 There are two main behavioural obstacles to this standard approach. 
First, the comparison of prices might be more difficult than the picture 
suggests. Prices might be framed differently which makes the 
comparison much less trivial than the comparison of two simple 
numbers. For example, if prices are broken down into several parts 
('partitioned pricing') the comparison requires more advanced numeracy 
skills. This problem is enhanced if the pricing is more complicated. (See 
also the OFT study on price framing and drip pricing a form of partitioned 
pricing, paragraph 3.103)  
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3.92 Second, sequential search is demanding on memory and consumers may 
have trouble remembering the exact prices they have encountered 
earlier. Again, the problem gets amplified if tariffs are more complicated.  
3.93 In this part we review models of competition where consumers search 
but this search is hampered because of some form of bounded 
rationality. In contrast to the previous discussion of search biases the 
search biases in Part 2 are much more explicitly modelled.  
3.94 The broad picture in the class of models reviewed in this part is that 
firms will employ strategies that are carefully tailored to the consumers’ 
biases. They will exploit imperfect recall of prices and will tailor their 
price framing such that in equilibrium consumers’ problems in making 
accurate judgements about price differences will come into play. Some 
of this will be reminiscent of what we have seen in Part 1 in models with 
endogenous search costs. While these previous models could be 
interpreted as behavioural in 'reduced form', the models we turn our 
attention to now offer micro foundations.  
3.95 Some of the basic intuition of the literature in this part of the survey is 
conveyed in the simple model shown in Annex B Box 4. In this model 
firms face the choice between two different price frames. If they choose 
identical frames, consumers will find comparisons very easy such that 
the outcome will be Bertrand competition with very low prices. On the 
other hand, if firms manage to coordinate on different price frames, they 
can achieve higher prices and larger profits. 
3.96 A theme we first discovered above will, unsurprisingly, reappear. If there 
are (some) consumers who have difficulties comparing (complicated) 
prices, increasing the number of firms can make things worse for 
consumers.  
3.97 Piccione and Spiegler (2009) examine markets where consumers are 
initially with one firm and consider switching. While some may switch 
whenever they encounter a better price, there may also be a fraction of 
consumers who will only switch if the price offered by the competitor is 
better and framed identically to the price at the current firm. As a 
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consequence, firms can avoid cut-throat competition simply by choosing 
price frames that are different. Essentially, this is similar to a form of 
artificial product differentiation that helps soften competition.  
3.98 Piccione and Spiegler focus on the duopoly case and show that in 
equilibrium firms will randomise over prices and frames. If both firms 
were to choose identical frames, intense price competition would result 
and it would obviously be profitable for a firm to deviate to a different 
frame. At the same time, if they were to choose different frames and 
higher prices, there would be an incentive for each firm to choose the 
same frame as its rival and slightly undercut. Consequently, there can 
only be a mixed strategy equilibrium in which each firm randomizes its 
frame choices to keep its rival guessing.  
3.99 Piccione and Spiegler show how regulatory interventions can backfire in 
such a setting. If, for example, a regulator enhances the comparability of 
two slightly different frames, firms might in response switch to different 
frames that are even harder to compare and consumers may as a result 
be worse off. Of course, if the regulator could enforce full comparability 
that would eliminate the problem completely, this would indeed render 
price competition much fiercer. However, in many markets (specifically 
in markets for more complex products) it might be naïve to think one 
could enforce a single price frame. 
3.100 Chioveanu and Zhou (2009) study similar markets but with an arbitrary 
number of firms and two sources of price misjudgement. First, 
consumers might have difficulties in comparing non-identical frames just 
as in Piccione and Spiegler. Second, they consider errors that stem from 
the complexity of frames as such, that is, they allow for the possibility 
that consumers do not choose the cheapest firm even if they use 
identical frames, simply because the employed frame is difficult to 
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understand. For example, consumers might make mistakes when adding 
up base prices to shipping and handling fees.13 
3.101 In equilibrium, markets will exhibit both price frame dispersion and price 
dispersion as in Piccione and Spiegler, and consumers will suffer from 
their inability to make accurate comparisons. Moreover, Chioveanu and 
Zhou show how increased competition can make things worse for 
consumers. With more firms (but given a fixed number of frames), it 
becomes more difficult for firms to differentiate their framing choices. In 
response, they will resort to frame complexity by adopting the more 
complicated frames more often, which enhances the second source of 
consumer error. As a result, firms have an incentive to charge even 
higher prices, and consumers can end up being strictly worse off.  
3.102 Kalayci and Potters (2010a and 2010b) show that the results of Piccione 
and Spiegler and Chioveanu and Zhou do not only occur in theorists’ 
models but actually do occur in markets. In two experimental studies 
they show how firms do resort to more complex pricing strategies (and 
more artificial product differentiation) when this is possible. They also 
show how this reduces the quality of consumer decision making and 
increases firms’ profits.  
3.103 More empirical evidence on how difficult consumers may find it to pick 
the lowest price can be found in a laboratory study reported in OFT 
2010. In this study six different price frames are examined in a simple 
search environment (drip pricing, offers of the 'was X, is now Y' type, 
time-limited offers, baiting where offers are in place only 'as long stocks 
last', complex '3 for 2' pricing, and as a baseline simple straight-per unit 
pricing). They find that all more elaborate price frames impact negatively 
on the quality of subjects’ decisions. The worst offender is drip pricing 
that, compared to the baseline, wipes out 25 per cent of consumer 
surplus. Firms (which are simulated in this experiment) do not 
                                     
13 Piccione and Spiegler actually consider a fairly general frame structure which can include both 
misjudgement sources discussed in Chioveanu and Zhou. The main difference between these 
two papers is that the latter allows for a general market structure. 
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necessarily gain from this but generally have an increased incentive to be 
the first firm that is visited by a consumer.14  
3.104 Chen, Iyer and Pazgal (2010) examine the second type of price 
misjudgement discussed above, imperfect recall of prices in a sequential 
search process. Building on the duopoly version of Varian’s search model 
they introduce a third type of consumer who can only remember 
whether the previously seen prices fall into one of a number of 
categories, for example, with two categories, whether a price was 'high' 
or 'low'. Consumers can form a given number of categories and are 
assumed to choose the cut-offs that separates the categories 
rationally.15 
3.105 The authors consider two different cases depending on whether the 
consumer who suffers from limited memory codes both prices 
encountered in the market into the existing categories, or only the first 
price which is then compared to the precise price encountered at the 
second firm. Surprisingly, expected prices in the latter case can increase 
with finer memory partitions. That is, improved consumer memory may 
harm themselves. The intuition is that with finer categories, if one firm 
undercuts, its rival is more able to respond by setting only slightly lower 
prices to retain its customers, which may dampen the firm’s incentive to 
undercut in the first place. 
3.106  Another interesting result in Chen et al. is that consumers calls for finer 
categorization toward the bottom of the price distribution. Thus 
consumers have a motivation to invest in greater memory resources in 
encoding lower prices. Even with few memory categories, Chen et al. 
                                     
14 In the context of retail finance markets, Choi, Laibson and Madarian (2008) show how 
consumers struggle to select index funds with low fees and Betrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir 
and Zinman (2009) show how lenders can employ simple marketing strategies (clear 
presentation, photos of female bank employees) can push up the interest rate consumers are 
willing to pay on loans. 
15 The model of limited memory and search (but without the supply side price competition) is 
initially proposed by Dow (1992). 
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show that the expected price consumers pay and their surplus is close to 
the case of perfect recall. So limited consumer memory seems not a big 
issue in this setting.  
3.107 However, the result needs to be taken with care as the demands on 
consumers’ computational ability (to choose optimal categorization) are 
extremely high in this model. It is not clear how the results would 
change with less sophisticated consumers. 
Quality bias I: misjudgement of vertically differentiated products 
3.108 As the standard IO literature discusses, consumers might in some cases 
struggle to identify high quality products in markets. In the standard 
literature, this is invariably due to the nature of the product and not to 
limitations of the consumer. If the quality of goods cannot be inspected 
at the point of purchase, consumers have to form beliefs about the likely 
quality of a product they face and full rationality implies that these 
expectations will be correct.  
3.109 These asymmetric information problems come in two flavours. There are 
experience goods where the quality will eventually be revealed during 
consumption. Second there are credence goods where the quality will 
never be revealed (for example, a patient might never know whether an 
expensive scan was really necessary for her diagnosis). However, in 
standard treatments of markets for such products consumers will never 
experience (bad) surprises. They will either abstain from buying when 
the expected quality is too low or they will know perfectly that certain 
products or services entail risks when they do buy them. 
3.110 This assumption of rational expectations is, of course, problematic as it 
is cognitively demanding, and introspection as well as casual observation 
suggest that people do experience surprises. The literature surveyed in 
this part of the survey offers alternative ways of thinking about how 
consumers actually choose among products of potentially different 
qualities. 
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3.111 Bohnet, Harmgart, Huck, and Tyran (2005) examine markets for 
experience goods in a laboratory environment. These markets fail in the 
absence of facilities that allow for reputation building. Firms succumb to 
moral hazard and consumers anticipate this correctly and do not buy at 
all.16 This holds in both, theory and practice. An eBay-style feedback 
mechanism enhances market outcomes considerably, benefitting both 
firms and consumers. Huck, Lunser, and Tyran (2006 and 2007) 
replicate these results and also examine the role of competition. They 
show how competition magnifies the effect of reputation building. Huck, 
Lunser and Tyran compare experimental monopolies and oligopolies, 
either with free pricing or in a setting with a fixed (regulated) price set at 
25 per cent above marginal costs.  
3.112 In markets with fixed (regulated) prices consumers pay very careful 
attention to firms’ track records and switch away from sellers of poor 
quality. This leads to high concentration with reliable high-quality sellers 
taking over the largest market shares.  
3.113 When prices become flexible, the consumer’s decision problem becomes 
more complex. They now have to examine two bits of information: past 
track records about quality and price. It turns out that the vast majority 
of consumers simply focus on price. This leads to Betrand-style 
competition and very low prices but also to poorer average quality of 
products traded. Prices fall to such a low level that high-quality 
production becomes hardly sustainable for firms and low quality almost 
acceptable for consumers. In other words, there is both, a push and a 
pull, towards lower quality and, thus, total welfare is lower in the 
presence of price competition than under a (comparatively high) 
regulated price.   
3.114 While, as this survey shows, consumers’ bounded rationality is mostly 
an impediment to market performance, Huck and Tyran (2007) show in 
a theoretical analysis how simple decision heuristics can also improve 
the performance of markets for experience goods. Specifically, they 
                                     
16 For example, Akerloff (1970) and the market for lemons.  
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study a market that would completely break down if all consumers were 
fully rational (simply, because in the presence of a moral hazard problem 
rational consumers will anticipate that once they trust a seller, the seller 
will have no incentive to provide high quality).  
3.115 If consumers demand an experience good repeatedly, a simple and 
plausible heuristic is to buy from the same supplier as long as he delivers 
high quality. Huck and Tyran show that such 'reciprocal' consumers 
exert a positive externality on all consumers. As firms want to keep their 
'loyal' consumers they will continue to provide high quality to them and 
to others, because they cannot distinguish between the two types. Of 
course, firms have to be sufficiently patient for this result to arise: They 
must prefer selling high quality over several periods to selling low quality 
in one period followed by zero sales in all subsequent periods. Thus, 
reciprocity among consumers can serve as a substitute for reputation 
building of firms.  
3.116 In a similar spirit to the experimental papers above, Dulleck, 
Kerschbamer, and Sutter (2010) examine markets for credence goods in 
a laboratory experiment. In a very large design they study the role of 
reputation and competition as well as the role of liability (the consumer’s 
problem must be solved) and verifiability (the firm can only charge for 
what it provides). The data shows that, in contrast to theoretical 
predictions, verifiability does not improve market outcomes. This is 
perhaps not surprising as the theoretical reason for why verifiability can 
improve market outcomes is very subtle. Firms need to learn to avoid the 
temptations of under-treatment through employing a price policy of equal 
mark-ups such that they earn the same amount from both treatments 
and consumers need to understand this.  
3.117 On the other hand, liability has a strong efficiency-enhancing effect. 
However, notice that liability only rules out 'under-treatment', that is, a 
situation where the consumer’s problem for which he seeks a supplier 
remains unsolved. The problem of 'overtreatment' where the consumer’s 
problem is solved with the provision of an expensive good or service, 
say, a new engine for the consumer’s car, while a cheaper solution, say, 
a new v-belt, would have had the same effect, remains unaffected. 
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3.118 In contrast to markets for experience goods, reputation building for 
credence goods does not really work (which is not surprising as 
consumers never learn more than they know at the point of purchase) 
and competition is unable to improve welfare. It shifts profits, however, 
to some extent from firms to consumers. 
3.119 When the quality of a product is inherently uncertain (it may or may not 
break down), consumers face an additional complexity when forming 
beliefs about the likely quality of a product. Spiegler (2006a) argues that 
it is realistic that consumers base their expectations in such cases on 
small samples of observations or 'anecdotal reasoning'. Specifically, 
Spiegler examines the case where each consumer has exactly one 
observation for each product in the market and assumes that this 
observation is a perfect estimator for the true quality. Thus, for each 
product each consumer believes that it is either of high quality for sure 
(in which case the consumer’s valuation for the product is positive) or of 
poor quality for sure (in which case the consumer’s valuation is zero). 
This creates artificial product differentiation - in the sense that 
consumers believe identical products to be of different quality. 
3.120 If consumers understood the true technology, the market would be a 
simple Bertrand market where firms would price at marginal cost. Now, 
however, the consumer’s decision rule is not 'buy the cheapest product' 
but 'buy the cheapest of those products for which you have seen that 
they do not break down.' 
3.121 As a consequence of this decision rule, firms will, in equilibrium, charge 
prices above marginal costs. The equilibrium will involve price dispersion 
as firms will randomise over a range of prices.17 The logic behind this 
randomisation is simple: Charging a very high price will give a high 
payoff with a small probability (namely, when all of the competitors’ 
products actually broke down and the product in question does not such 
                                     
17 This randomization result is partly because of the assumption of binary quality levels. If we 
consider a continuum of quality levels, then the model will be similar to Perloff and Salop (1985) 
in which firms charge a deterministic price above the marginal cost. 
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that consumers believe the only good-quality product is the high-price 
one), while charging a low price will give a small profit with a higher 
probability (namely, when some other products are also judged of high-
quality but their prices are higher). In equilibrium, the expected profits 
from high and low prices will simply equate. 
3.122 A surprising feature of Spiegler’s analysis is that consumers can be 
harmed from too much competition. With more firms, it becomes more 
likely that a consumer hears at least one 'positive anecdote', so more 
consumers will participate in the market and buy an 'overpriced' product. 
In other words, with more firms the objective quality of each product 
stays the same, but it becomes more likely that there are more firms 
where no breakdowns have been witnessed. Hence, higher prices can be 
charged. 
3.123 Notice that this is subtly different from models where consumers do not 
fully understand the price. Here consumers do understand the pricing, 
but their expectation of the quality is biased such that ex post they 
might end up being exploited. Again, it is this empirical angle that drives 
our classification. A disappointed consumer in Spiegler’s world would 
not say 'I did not fully understand the pricing of my supplier and paid 
more than I thought I would'. Rather she would say 'The product I 
bought was not as good as I hoped it would be'.   
3.124 A similar analysis for more complex products is carried out in Spiegler 
(2006b). Firms offer products with multiple characteristics (for example, 
insurance contracts with various contingencies; a bank account with 
many services). Each firm charges separate prices along each dimension 
of the product. Evaluating such multi-dimensional price scheme is usually 
a complicated task for ordinary consumers, so they are assumed to 
simplify their decisions by examining one dimension at random and 
comparing offers only along that particular dimension. (But consumers 
will eventually pay for all dimensions.)  
3.125 As a consequence, firms choose to randomize prices in each dimension. 
The intuition is that setting low prices in some dimensions can attract 
consumers who happen to compare products along these dimensions. 
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The firm can then earn money back by charging them high prices in 
other dimensions since consumers eventually pay for all dimensions.  
3.126 With more competitors, firms will make their pricing more extreme: with 
greater competition, the firm needs to set lower prices in some 
dimensions in order to attract consumers, but to compensate that, it will 
charge higher prices in other dimensions. This leads to more variable 
prices in each dimension. More precisely, Spiegler shows that increasing 
the number of firms does not change the expected price in each 
dimension, but only increases the variance. One interpretation of this 
result is that firms will respond to greater competition by 'obfuscating' 
consumers. If consumers are risk averse, this reduces their welfare.18  
3.127 An earlier contribution on products that fail probabilistically is Spence 
(1977). He analyses the case where consumers underestimate the failure 
probability of a product systematically (they are overoptimistic). Even a 
competitive market will then not provide efficient quality. This result is 
intuitive and resembles some of the logic we have seen in our sections 
on misperception of own demand. Markets will cater to consumers’ 
beliefs and preferences, whether these are biased or not. 
Quality bias II: misperception of demand for product attributes 
3.128 We have included this category mainly for conceptual reasons as we 
believe that it covers an important area of our map of competition with 
behaviourally biased consumers. However, as important as this area may 
be, relatively little research has been done on this topic. Zhou (2008) is 
an attempt in this direction.  
3.129 Many products have a large number of attributes. It is usually a 
complicated task for ordinary consumers to value them in a proper way. 
Zhou studies a model in which the firm can use single-attribute 
                                     
18 This result still holds if consumers are risk neutral but firms can choose both price and quality 
in each dimension and there are diminishing returns to quality improvement. The last condition 
leads to a concave surplus function, which has a similar effect as consumers being risk averse. 
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advertising which only highlights one attribute of the product to 
manipulate the way consumers value the product.19 In particular, naïve 
consumers who are not knowledgeable enough will thus overvalue the 
importance of the advertised attribute but undervalue the importance of 
the unadvertised one. For example, a consumer might find a digital 
camera’s number of pixels more important than it actually is after seeing 
an advertisement that focuses on the number of pixels. 
3.130 Together with advertising, the firm has an incentive to design different 
products to screen naïve consumers from sophisticated consumers who 
are immune to advertising. Zhou shows that the product designed for 
naïve consumers has a too high quality in the advertised dimension and a 
too low quality in the unadvertised dimension, while that designed for 
sophisticated consumers is distorted in the opposite way. The outcome 
is that naïve consumers will end up consuming a product that scores 
extremely well on an attribute but has a mediocre overall performance, 
while sophisticated consumers cannot find the product they most want, 
which reflects the negative externality imposed by the presence of naïve 
consumers. (Notice that the naïve type gets indeed what she wants but 
her demand is distorted because of misperception.) 
3.131 As is well-known from the competitive price discrimination literature, 
competition may completely eliminate such distortions but that depends 
crucially on a number of assumptions, for example, a fully covered 
market and the symmetry between firms (see Armstrong and Vickers 
2001, and Rochet and Stole 2002 for details). If these assumptions are 
violated, the distortion in product design may survive even under 
competition. 
 
                                     
19 The idea that consumers may value a multi-dimensional option in an improper way bears a 
resemblance to Spiegler (2006b), but here the distorted valuation is induced by the firm’s 
marketing activity rather than being intrinsic to consumers. 
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4 REMEDIES 
4.1 Our survey has shown that generally markets do not work well in the 
presence of behaviourally biased consumers. Hence, it is natural to ask 
whether there are any remedies, mechanisms, or other channels that can 
improve the quality of consumers’ choices and ultimately market 
outcomes. 
4.2 Figure 4.1 provides a schematic overview of which remedies can assist 
to improve outcomes for consumers depending on the bias and its root 
cause. As will be discussed below, some remedies work on some biases 
but not on others. For example whilst learning has the potential to help 
regarding both the Misperception and Misjudgement biases, competition 
only helps when consumers have misperceptions. 
Figure 4.1: Remedies 
 
 
Reference points 
and loss aversion 
 
Inertia 
Competition 
Information 
Learning 
Misperception of 
desired attributes 
Misperception of 
desired quantities 
Standardisation 
Misjudgement of 
quality 
Misjudgement of 
prices 
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Intensifying competition through increasing the number of firms 
4.3 More competition through lower barriers to entry and a greater number 
of competing firms is, of course, the economist’s standard tool when it 
comes to the question of how to improve markets and what they deliver 
to consumers. However, we have seen in this survey that in the 
presence of behavioural biases competition may not always solve 
behavioural problems. Specifically, we have seen the possibility of 
adverse effects of competition emerging in that part of the survey 
(reviewed in Chapter 3) that dealt with search biases arising from inertia 
and misjudgement of prices, and quality biases arising from 
misjudgement of vertical quality as illustrated in Chapter 2, Figure 2.1. In 
contrast, models reviewed in Chapter 3 that examine willingness to pay 
biases arising from reference point effects and loss aversion, 
misperception of future demand and quality biases arising from 
horizontal misperception of quality (shown in Figure 2.1), while not 
necessarily a pancea, competition was never seen to do harm.  
4.4 The logic for this is that for models from the left half of the panel in 
Figure 4.1 competition works in the same way as it does in standard 
models, only with 'distorted' demand curves. Reference points generate 
kinks in demand curves and misperception of demand and desired 
attributes either shifts demand curves outward or inward, or redresses 
the balance of desired product quantities. But once these demand 
patterns are given, the forces of competition work as they do in the 
standard literature and there is little surprise in that. Fundamentally these 
biases do not change the consumers’ desire to find the best deal. Hence, 
increasing competition through more firms will always have (at least 
weakly) positive effects although in many circumstances some allocative 
inefficiencies may remain even under perfect competition. 
4.5 The picture is radically different for models from the right half of the 
panel in Figure 4.1 where the behavioural biases affect consumers’ 
search and decision rules such that they might no longer buy from the 
cheapest, best-value firm - sometimes because they do not search long 
enough due to inertia, sometimes because they have difficulties 
comparing the prices arising in misjudgement of prices and misjudgement 
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of quality. In these type of models there are some consumers who don’t 
care if things are expensive or can’t tell good quality from bad.20 Here 
competition might no longer work as effectively simply because it is less 
clear that firms have an incentive to undercut each other. Why would 
they if consumers do not necessarily go for the cheapest firm?  
4.6 Once the clear incentive to undercut is removed, firms have to weigh 
their options: They can go for low prices trying to attract those 
consumers that search a lot and do make the right judgements, or they 
can go for higher prices trying to prey on those consumers who do not 
search much or, if they do, fall victim to poor judgement.  
4.7 As we have seen, this tension on its own can be enough to neutralise 
the beneficial effects of competition. However in specific cases it may 
also create adverse effects of competition, simply think of Stahl’s model 
where entry reduces firms’ incentives to charge low prices because 
consumers will be less likely to locate the good offers (see paragraphs 
3.67 to 3.70). Things may turn even worse when firms can engage in 
activities that deliberately make search and judgements harder, simply 
because the incentive to do so will often increase when the number of 
firms goes up.  
4.8 In summary, competition may not always be able to solve consumer 
issues and indeed in specific cases may even be problematic. However 
as long as firms have a clear incentive to undercut, or more generally, to 
offer a better deal to consumers, competition can only improve market 
outcomes. In environments when firms lack this universal incentive to 
undercut because some consumers might, for lack of time or prudence, 
buy from a more expensive firm, competition through more firms can 
backfire and make consumers strictly worse off. 
                                     
20 One might argue that some of the biases such as reference points may affect the ability to 
search indirectly because consumers stop search earlier than they should. However, although 
consumers like something more than they initially thought they would (because they compare 
other products to the product they have perhaps seen first), it does not fundamentally change 
their desire to find the best deal.  
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Learning 
4.9 Again we can go back to Figure 4.1 this time cutting through it 
horizontally .The models in the bottom half (reference points and inertia) 
model consumer biases through preferences. Accordingly, there is no 
scope for learning as consumers do maximise without error given their 
preferences. Of course, preferences might change over time and there is 
some evidence that professionals are less prone to reference point 
effects (for example, List 2003).21 Moreover, as we have discussed in 
the inertia section above at some length, the interpretation of some 
models with high search or switching costs, specifically those where 
firms can influence these costs, is suggestive of cognitive limitations 
which with more practice may be overcome (see paragraphs 3.71 to 
3.76). When viewed from this angle, there might also be some scope for 
improvement of consumers’ search behaviour through experience and 
learning. Therefore, if inertia arises due to cognitive limitations causing 
misjudgement of prices, then learning can potentially help. 
4.10 The models that fall into the top half of the panel in Figure 4.1 represent 
much more obvious cases for learning to be relevant. This is because 
these are models where consumers make errors and will often find out 
about their suboptimal choice. For example, if consumers mispredict 
their future demand, they will eventually find this out when their actual 
demand is realised. This gives them the chance not to repeat their 
mistakes. Of course, if their misperception is driven by some underlying 
bias (say, over-optimism or a self-control problem or a vicious 
combination of both) then learning requires that the consumer admits to 
herself that she has a problem, for example, that she admits to herself 
that she is an impatient hyperbolic discounter suffering from self-control 
problems. It requires more than just a simple adjustment of behaviour: it 
requires dropping one’s naiveté to become sophisticated.  
                                     
21 List observes using economic experiments that experienced traders in a naturally occurring 
market (sports cards) are less prone to this bias,   
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4.11 Similarly, consumers have the scope to learn when the source of their 
errors is misjudgement of (vertical) quality or misjudgement of prices. 
Clearly, they will have reason to re-think their choice rules when they 
bought a product of inferior quality that soon breaks down. But there is 
also scope for learning when consumers tend to misjudge price. 
Repeated experience with complicated price frames will probably make it 
easier for consumers to see through them (OFT 2010, see paragraph 
3.18). Also, friends or family might point out better deals that would 
have been available elsewhere.  
4.12 Insofar as some of these errors are driven by poor numeracy or cognitive 
skills there is, of course, only limited scope for learning. Moreover, with 
age performance might even drop due to a general decline of cognitive 
ability (for example, Banks and Oldfield 2007).22  
4.13 From the viewpoint of learning and cognitive skills it might be 
worthwhile to think about and to identify particularly vulnerable 
consumers in such markets. Currently there is little formal discussion of 
this in the literature. 
Information and standardisation of information 
4.14 More information and market transparency is generally predicted to 
improve market outcomes in all models considered here with the 
exception of those in the top left corner of Figure 4.1, the models on 
misperception of own demand. There consumers would need better 
information about their own future demands and this may well be 
impossible to provide. 
4.15 In the bottom left of Figure 4.1, the case of reference point effects, 
there is scope for information to have an impact even though the 
consumer bias is driven by preferences. However, these preferences 
                                     
22 Banks and Oldfield consider a sample of older people in England and find that a large 
proportion of this sample have low levels of numeracy, and that numeracy is strongly related to 
the understanding of pension arrangements and the choice to invest in retirement savings.  
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shape ('distort') behaviour only when consumers initially do not know all 
prices and characteristics of goods in the market. It is this uncertainty 
that gives scope for reference point effects. If consumers had all options 
on the table from the first moment and considered them simultaneously, 
their status quo bias and loss aversion would simply not matter. 
4.16 That more information about the price and quality of available goods 
tends to improve markets where consumers might not search enough or 
might misjudge price and quality is intuitive. There are, however, some 
subtle exceptions that can arise in search markets. If for example, 
increased price transparency only lowers the search costs for consumers 
who do engage in search but leaves those who do not unaffected, then, 
in equilibrium, prices might be higher because it is now relatively more 
attractive to exploit inert consumers rather than to compete for price 
aware consumers (Baye, Gatti, Kattuman and Morgan 2006).23 A similar 
counter-intuitive result on adverse effects of lower search costs is 
demonstrated in Zhou (2010) who examines markets where consumers 
search for multiple products simultaneously. When consumers find the 
comparison of products difficult then standardisation of the way in 
which information is presented to the consumer can have a significant 
beneficial effect (see, for example, Chater, Huck, and Inderst (2010)).24 
However, such standardisation can backfire if not complete, as has been 
discussed in Piccione and Spiegler (2009) (see paragraphs 3.97 to 3.99). 
                                     
23 Baye et., al. study the introduction of the Euro, they observe that average prices for a set of 
28 commodities on an online shopping site rise post Euro introduction. The model they use to 
explain this observation is one which looks at the trade-off firms face to reduce prices and 
capture consumers that search or raising prices to increase rents from their loyal (or inert) 
consumers.   
24 This study for The European Commission used two controlled experiments (one with 
university students and one with a consumer subject pool) to test consumer choice between 
alternative retail investment products. The authors observed that when information about the 
products was framed in a standardised way consumers were more likely to choose the better 
product.  
OFT1324   |  59
  
  
  
 
 
Reputation 
4.17 Whenever consumers realise that they have been taken advantage of, 
that is, in the very same cases where learning can be effective, there is 
also scope for firms to create a reputation, namely a reputation for not 
engaging in exploitative strategies. Consumers might reward such a 
reputation with repeat custom and perhaps even higher WTP, for 
example, because they trust that they will also not be exploited in the 
future or because of reciprocity or, in the terminology of Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser (2004), as a consequence of 'betrayal aversion'. 25 Such 
reputation building can greatly enhance the effects of learning 
4.18 In some cases firms will be able to build up a reputation on their own 
quite effectively, in particular when they have a large market share. For 
example an airline that abandons any elements of drip pricing, might gain 
a reputation for fair pricing or even more broadly for operating a 'fair 
business'. In other markets, reputation building is far more difficult to 
achieve for firms on their own and information sharing among consumers 
can greatly boost reputations and their effective destruction. A prime 
example for such information sharing among consumers is 'e-bay’s' 
feedback mechanism or, in the travel industry, 'tripadvisor.com'.  
Consumer education and de-biasing 
4.19 A common theme in this survey is that firms can profit from consumer 
biases and, in cases where competition cannot mitigate these benefits, 
firms do not have much incentive to engage in de-biasing activities. Only 
if such activities would help to build a brand reputation for 'fair 
treatment of consumers' could consumer education form part of a 
successful firm strategy. However, as the analysis in Gabaix and Laibson 
(2006) shows clearly, there are limitations to this, in particular when 
sophisticated consumers are cross-subsidised by biased consumers. The 
problem then is that by educating a consumer the firm will not only lose 
                                     
25 'Betrayal aversion' is a situation in which people are generally less willing to take on a risk 
when the source of the risk is the behaviour of another person rather than nature (or a lottery).  
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the extra profits it would have made from the otherwise biased 
consumer, it will lose this consumer completely as she would switch to 
another supplier who still operates a scheme of exploiting naïve 
consumers for the benefit of sophisticated consumers. In general, 
whenever sophisticated consumers benefit from the presence of biased 
consumers, firms will have no incentive to de-bias (see paragraphs 3.47 
to 3.52). 
4.20 This leaves the possibility that third parties, the press, or government 
agencies could engage in consumer education and, surely, such efforts 
cannot have adverse effects. However, there is some literature that 
throws doubt on the effectiveness of de-biasing and education, certainly 
from a cost-benefit point of view. For example effective education may 
not be a simple matter (see, for example, Chater, Huck, and Inderst 
201026 or Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 201027). 
                                     
26 In this study for the European Commission (also referred to in paragraph Annexe(s)4.16), 
observed that education only had a marginal effect on optimal choice in the retail investment 
product experiments.   
27 The authors observed using economic experiments that that the provision of education about 
alternative pension plans had only a relatively small effect on the likelihood of subjects selecting 
the optimal plan. As such the authors suggest that education on its own is not necessarily a 
pancea for mitigating consumer biases.  
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5 EMPRICIAL STRATEGIES 
5.1 How can one identify markets that suffer from any of the discussed 
biases that we have surveyed? 
5.2 From a policy-oriented perspective this question is of first-order 
importance. Interventions to prevent misallocations due to consumer 
behavioural biases require proof of such biases. In this chapter we briefly 
discuss empirical strategies to identify the presence of biases 
emphasising the type of data that one would need for such 
identification. 
Firm behaviour 
5.3 The most traditional approach to study market performance is supply-
side oriented, and, in light of the literature surveyed here, there are 
several practices firms might engage in that may serve as indirect proof 
of biases in consumer behaviour. Specifically, employing elaborate price 
frames (like drip pricing) which do not change the nature of actual 
prices, and costly changes to price frames over time may be an 
indication that firms are seeking to benefit from consumer biases. 
Similarly, attempts at obfuscation and any kind of shrouding can serve 
as potential virtual proof of problems that consumers face in making 
sense of firms’ offers. Of course this is not evidence of 'bad' behaviour, 
but can act as an indication of which markets we may want to 
investigate further (we discuss this further in the following paragraph).  
5.4 There are other activities that can look similarly suspicious but might 
have their reason in actual consumer preferences. In particular, very 
ornate pricing strategies with multi-part tariffs might occur as a form of 
exploitation of consumer biases but might also occur to serve rational 
consumers with diverse needs best. Invariably, such tariffs might trigger 
concern but warrant deeper more detailed investigation. The same holds 
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for employing loss leaders28 or engaging in other activities that are 
designed to influence consumers’ search activity. 
5.5 Overall, there are very clear limits to what the traditional supply-side 
oriented approach can achieve alone. In almost all cases, there are two 
stories one can tell when confronted with activities that arise in markets 
with biased consumers; this is because, these activities might also arise 
in markets with heterogeneous sophisticated consumers (as mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph with multi-part tariffs, also see DellaVigna 
and Malmendier’s (2004) in paragraph 3.34). Exceptions are price 
frames that simply change the appearance of the actual price from 
something that is straightforward and easy to understand into something 
more complicated and deliberately obfuscating and shrouding. In both 
these cases, there is also potential scope for direct regulation of firm 
behaviour. For example, practices such as drip pricing could simply be 
outlawed without any adverse consequences. 
5.6 However, as our survey has shown there are several other variants of 
markets with behaviourally biased consumers and these require 
alternative empirical strategies – strategies that examine directly the 
demand side. In the following paragraphs we will enlist these strategies 
and explain their scope for application as well as their data needs. 
Observe consumer choice and (market) prices 
5.7 Price dispersion can easily be detected in market data and is, as we have 
seen, indicative of search costs (see for example paragraphs 3.17 and 
3.60). Such markets can be problematic regardless of where the search 
costs stem from, simply because standard intuition about the welfare 
effects of lowering barriers to entry can go wrong.  
5.8 Without further data it will generally be impossible to learn anything 
about the source of high search costs. High search costs may stem from 
high economic opportunity costs (maybe we are examining a market for 
                                     
28 Loss leaders are products sold at cost or below cost to generate other profitable sales. 
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a good in high demand among highly paid individuals) but could also 
stem from consumer ignorance.  
5.9 A slightly different case arises when consumers are observed to 
purchase goods at an excessive price when the same supplier also offers 
a cheaper variant. Essentially, this is DellaVigna and Malmendier’s 
strategy in their analysis of gym memberships (see paragraph 3.31). 
Given their actual gym usage, many consumers would ex post have been 
better off opting for pay-as-you-go schemes rather than memberships. 
Observe consumer choice and consideration set 
5.10 Perhaps the most direct strategy to prove biased decision making, or to 
be more precise, errors in decision making, is to compare the consumer’s 
actual choice with his consideration set, that is, with all alternatives that 
the consumer had under consideration when making his purchase. This 
strategy is most promising for the class of markets where consumers 
suffer from misjudgement of price and quality. If the consumer chooses 
a product that is strictly, and objectively, dominated by another product 
in her choice set, this cannot be due to preference but must be a 
consequence of misjudgement. 
5.11 While this is the clearest type of proof, data on consideration sets might 
be hard to obtain. Typically, consideration sets cannot be easily 
observed as one would have to track the entire search process of a 
consumer. Moreover, consumers who are prone to making mistakes 
when comparing prices are unlikely to have perfect recall of the goods 
they have considered prior to a purchase so asking consumers to report 
their consideration set appears not the most promising strategy either. 
An exception to this rule could be tracking consumers search on the 
internet. In principle, cookies and other traces of a consumer’s search 
history could contain the desired data. Studies that track consumers’ 
internet purchases might, thus, be the most fruitful avenue for empirical 
work that aims at comparing choices to other considered alternatives.  
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5.12 Economic experiments are also a useful method for observing consumer 
choice. Controlled economic experiments can isolate errors in decision-
making from a pre-determined set of choices and pay-offs. 
Ask the consumer after purchase 
5.13 This is the first strategy considered here that essentially rests on survey 
methods rather than choice data. It comes, thus, with the usual caveats 
concerning the reliability of questionnaires. But for several of the 
consumer biases considered here this appears to be the most efficient 
empirical strategy. 
5.14 Specifically, in all cases of misperception of desired quantities 
consumers should be able to tell later that they initially believed their 
demand would be greater or smaller and that, when they made their 
purchase (or signed up for their contract), they made a mistake. 
5.15 It is exactly this ability of consumers' to realise that they originally 
misperceived their demand that also enables (conscious) consumer 
learning. 
5.16 Presumably, the strategy of simply asking consumers after the fact is a 
little less promising in cases of misperceptions of the type of good 
desired, simply because it is harder for the consumer to learn that she 
actually made a mistake. A biased product that boosts extremely good 
characteristics in a dimension where less would not do harm, the 
consumer might never find out that this dimension is actually not so 
important. Likewise reference points may not be effectively identified 
through this method as the consumer (in the absence of information 
provision, see paragraph 4.15, and 5.19 below) may not know a 
reference point has influenced their choice. Again, in this case, 
controlled economic experiments could be used to reveal misperceptions. 
5.17 This is different for cases of vertical quality differences (misjudgement of 
quality). Consumers who purchased a low-quality product will report 
disappointment when they expected higher quality. 
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5.18 Finally, we can consider the case of misjudgement of prices. Again, it is 
more questionable that consumers will recall that they could have paid a 
lower price when they actually 'forgot' the low price during the 
purchasing process. However, it is plausible that consumers might report 
confusion and/or uncertainty experienced during the search process 
which could be indicative of a real problem, but, of course, no proof. 
Supporting proof could be elicited through the use of controlled 
economic experimentation.  
Elicit the consumer's WTP before the purchase 
5.19 So far, none of the discussed empirical strategies appears useful to 
prove the role and effect of reference points in markets. This is perhaps 
not so surprising as reference point effects are a matter of preference 
similar to preferences for certain (maybe odd) type of products. 
However, as shifting reference points can shift consumers’ WTP there is 
an obvious procedure the empirical economist can employ. He can ask 
the consumer before she starts her search process about her WTP and 
compare it later to actually paid prices. If actual prices paid are higher 
than initial WTP, this would be indicative of reference point effects in 
the mode of Zhou, that is, reference points that are formed during the 
search process (see paragraph 3.15). 
5.20 While this sounds like a fool-proof method (in particular when one has 
access to incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms such as a Vickrey 
auction or the random price mechanism of Becker, de Groot, and 
Marshak29) there is one potential caveat - if the researcher asks the 
consumer, say, outside a shop she is about to enter, about her WTP for 
some product, this could very well alter the consumer’s behaviour as it 
could make her more aware of her original WTP and, hence, reduce the 
likelihood of reference point shifts and changes in WTP. 
                                     
29 The Vickery auction and the Becker, deGroot and Marshak mechanism are methods which are 
designed to elicit truthful willingness to pay. People tend to under report their true valuation for 
goods when they know that the goods are allocated based on these valuations.  
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Other survey methods and ethnographic studies 
5.21 We are left with a situation where we have for almost all of the biases 
that we considered at least one or two potential avenues to examine 
them empirically. The exception to this is inertia where we have no 
empirical avenues to examine its' driver, that is, the question whether 
inertia is rational or not. If a consumer does not search or does not 
switch the fundamental reason might always be real cost, whether 
monetary or psychological, and non-searching, non-switching consumers 
might well be aware that they forgo better deals. It is just that they have 
concluded it does not pay for them to engage in more intensive search. 
5.22 In such cases of inertia, the empiricist has probably the hardest task. He 
needs to understand the true sources of inertia and make a judgement 
call on whether these sources can reasonably be rationalised. Obtaining 
proof requires then in-depths surveys or even ethnographic studies. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 One key conclusion we want to emphasis at the outset is that we feel 
that the literature surveyed here deserves to be taken seriously. It has 
become evident that the literature is now more than just a collection of 
intellectually interesting curiosities. The literature can be grouped into 
relevant areas of consumer choice and shows substantial consistency 
and robustness within each area. 
6.2 The most striking result of the literature so far is that increasing 
competition through fostering entry of more firms may not on its own 
always improve outcomes for consumers. Indeed competition may not 
help when there are at least some consumers who do not search 
properly or have difficulties judging quality and prices (see Figure 4.1 
and paragraphs 4.2 to 4.8). In the presence of such consumers it is no 
longer clear that firms necessarily have an incentive to compete by 
offering better deals. Rather, they can focus on exploiting biased 
consumers who are very likely to purchase from them regardless of price 
and quality. These effects can be made worse through firms' deliberate 
attempts to make price comparisons and search harder (through complex 
pricing, shrouding, etc) and obscure product quality. The incentives to 
engage in such activities become more intense when there are more 
competitors. In these situations complementary policies such as learning, 
provision of information and standardisation of information and frames 
can help (Figure 4.1, and paragraphs 4.9 to 4.20). 
6.3 On the other hand, competition tends to work as standard intuition 
suggests if biases simply distort consumers' demand without affecting 
their desire to search for the best deals in light of their demand (Figure 
4.1 and paragraphs 4.2 to 4.8). While competition is unable to eradicate 
the allocative inefficiencies that arise in response to these distortions, 
entry from more firms can never harm consumers and will mostly make 
them strictly better off. 
6.4 Related to this main result is the finding that in the presence of 
behaviourally biased consumers markets cannot always be expected to 
self correct. Sometimes gains from exploiting a certain bias may be 
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partially competed away through very attractive prices for another 
product to attract consumers in the first place (depending on the extent 
of competition). Such 'waterbed effects' always depend, however, on 
the fine detail of the market and cannot be taken for granted. 
6.5 We also find that firms may sometimes have little incentive to educate 
consumers. This is particularly severe if educated or sophisticated 
consumers benefit from the pricing offered by those firms who do not 
engage in consumer education (see for example paragraph 3.59 and the 
search models). However, where learning will eventually eradicate 
consumer biases, firms may have a clear incentive to establish a 
reputation for 'fair behaviour' early on (see for example paragraph 
3.111). 
6.6 The extent to which behavioural effects matter in real markets is, as of 
the time we are writing this survey, largely unknown. While there is 
substantial evidence for firms employing strategies that basically only 
make sense when consumers are biased in one way or other, there is 
little direct evidence on how consumer choice deviates from full 
rationality. In view of these deviations' potential importance for market 
outcomes, more empirical work is, we believe, urgently called for.  
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Box 1 Figure: Overestimation of future demand 
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Box 2 Figure: Underestimation of future demand 
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